Destiny in the Pacific: implications for U.S. policy of rising Japanese nationalism and economic power. by Hill, Gerald D. III.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1986
Destiny in the Pacific: implications for U.S. policy of
rising Japanese nationalism and economic power.













DESTINY IN THE PACIFIC:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY OF RISING
JAPANESE NATIONALISM AND ECONOMIC POWER
by
Gerald D. Hill III
June 1986
Thesis Advisor: Claude
Co-advis or : Edward
A. Buss
A. Olsen










E SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY
DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
3 DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY OF REPORT
Approved for public release; distribution
is unlimited.
PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)





7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
Naval Postgraduate School
ADDRESS (G'ty, State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, California 93943-5100
7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, California 93943-5100




9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUM8ER









1. TITLE (Include Security Classification)
Implications for U.S. Policy of Parsing Japanese Nationalism
Destiny in the Pacific: and Economic Power
2 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)
Gerald D. Hill III











18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
Japan, Nationalism, Ultra-nationalism, Militarism,
Destiny, Defense, Policy, United States
9 ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
[he thesis of this paper is that rising Japanese economic power has been reinforced over
the last decade by a traditional sense of nationalism and pride in Japan. This swell of
sentiment has at it's roots the same components which led to the growth of militarism in
the 1930 's. This paper examines the growth of modern nationalism in Japan through this
century, stressing those components of the culture and the environment which are common
to both pre- and post-World War II Japan.
The clear theme gleaned from Japanese actions in this century is her faith in her cwn
destiny as an international leader. Current U.S. policy with regard to trade and defense
toward Japan is too heavy-handed, too likely to produce a backlash of sentiment in Japan
in the coming years. The U.S. needs a policy which recognizes the Japanese view of their
role in the world but at the same time draws them into a position supportive of U.S.
20 DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT
UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED D SAME AS RPT. D DTIC USERS
21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
unclassified
!2a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL
bauds A - Ri1^




)D FORM 1473, 84 MAR 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted.
All other editions are obsolete.
1
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PACE (Whin Data Bn(ara«Q
interests in the Pacific and the world. This paper concludes by proposing
a new policy for the U.S. which accords best with the cultural, economic,
and political developments of modern Japan.
UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGEfWTian Dmlm Bnffd)
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Destiny in the Pacific: Implications for U. S. Policy of
Rising Japanese Nationalism and Economic Power
by
Gerald D. Hill III
Major, United States Army
B. S. , United -States Military Academy, 1975
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
: LL -""ft 1? 86
ABSTRACT
The thesis of this paper is that rising Japanese
economic power has been reinforced over the last decade by a
traditional sense of nationalism and pride in Japan. This
swell of sentiment has at its roots the same components
which led to the growth of militarism in the 1930' s. This
paper examines the growth of modern nationalism in Japan
through this century, stressing those components of the
culture and the environment which are common to both pre-
and post -World War II Japan.
The clear theme gleaned from Japanese actions in this
century is her faith in her own destiny as an international
leader. Current U. S. policy with regard to trade and
defense toward Japan is too heavy-handed, too likely to
produce a backlash of sentiment in Japan in the coming
years. The U. S. needs a policy which recognizes the
Japanese view of their role in the world but at the same
time draws them into a position supportive of U. S. interests
in the Pacific and the world. This paper concludes by
proposing a new policy for the U. S. which accords best with
the cultural, economic, and political developments of modern
Japan.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE AND THESIS STATEMENT
The purpose of this paper is to propose a policy for the
United States to improve relations with Japan. To achieve
this goal, I have researched their fundamental beliefs
including legends and myths as well as Japanese history for
clues to their methods of thinking as revealed in their
actions and reactions to world events. I have found
significant similarities and parallels between Japanese
ultranationalism of the early twentieth century and Japanese
economic expansion of the 1970' s and 80 's. Later chapter
will examine the 1920 's and 1930' s in greater detail to
bring out these parallels. On the surface the two may
appear unrelated, however, in terms of an expression of
Japanese nationalism, there are some common threads. It is
this potent force of nationalism which will be the common
theme throughout this paper.
In 1983 Prime Minister Nakasone referred to relations
between Japan and the United States as similar to those
before the Second World War 1 and in early 1985, Matsunaga
*His comments drew parallels between Japanese military
expansion of the 1930' s and Japanese economic expansion in
the 1980 f s. See "Japan Plans Wider Role on Defense,"
Washington Post . 19 January 1983, p. 1.
Nobuo, 2 then ambassador- designee to the United States said
that "sentiment in the United States is like that before the
outbreak of a war.
"
3 Such ominous comments support very
directly the thesis of this paper which is that rising
Japanese economic power over the decade of 1975-1985 has
reinforced, and has been reinforced, by a growing sense of
nationalism and pride in Japan- -a swell of sentiment which
has at its roots the similar components as those that led to
the growth of militarism in the 1930 's.
The United States in the mid- 1980' s is at a critical
juncture in its policymaking. Poor decisions could lead the
U. S. away from what should be our goal of closer bilateral
ties and produce a nationalistic backlash which does little
to improve our ties with Japan and resolve our differences.
This growing, powerful nationalistic sentiment is malleable
now and must not be hammered with an iron- fisted policy but
skillfully cast into the links which will bind our nations
together.
2Japanese names will be printed with the family names
first, as is the Japanese tradition.
3
"U. S. -Japan Relations 'Critical'," Monterey Peninsula
Herald . 14 March 1985, p. 34.
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B. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
It has been the nature of Japan since the Meiji
Restoration to be very concerned with her status or mission
in the world. Japan's promulgation of the Charter Oath in
1868 specifically included a provision for seeking knowledge
to enhance the imperial rule 4 and was initially exercised in
the form of accepting all things Western as good. There
was, in short, a pronounced reaction to be like the West.
Emerging from a period of extended isolation to confront a
world of white 5 imperialism, the Japanese, unlike the
Chinese, quickly recognized the danger posed to their
sovereignty by the Western powers of the day, and so were
careful to avoid falling under their domination. Steps were
taken to insure that Japan rapidly progressed to a point of
equivalency with the Western world. 6 These steps included
4 See Delmer Brown, Nationalism in Japan . (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1955), p. 94.
5 References to "white" as they apply to the period of
approximately 1850-1940 refer to the racist differentiations
made at that time between the White European nations and the
Yellow Asian nations.
6The history of the half-century or so following the
Perry expedition is well covered in Tyler Dennett, Americans
in East Asia . New York: Barnes and Noble, 1942. , John K.
Fairbank, Edwin 0. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, East
Asia : Tradition and Transformation , Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1978. (cited hereafter as Fairbank, East Asia.)
and Alfred Griswold, Far Eastern Policy of the U.S. , New
York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1938. Also see Jon
Livingston, Joe Moore, and Felicia Oldfather, Imperial Japan
1800-1945 . New York: Pantheon Books, 1973, for a collection
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becoming "like the West" as this was seen as necessary in
order to compete.
Half a century after Perry's arrival, this once feudal, 7
backward nation had defeated the Russians and was rapidly
becoming a nation of international prominence. Almost
exactly forty years after the Russo-Japanese War of June
1904- January 1905, the Japanese were in ruin following a
disastrous war of imperialism. What happened to allow the
militaristic forces of Japan to acquire and then abuse power
form the root causes of the Pacific War and must be
examined. Additionally, the social forces within 20th
century Japan will be surveyed for their importance in
Japanese relations with the rest of the world.
Forty years have passed since V-J Day and Japan has
emerged as one of the foremost economic powers of the world.
In the one hundred-plus years since Perry's arrival, the
Japanese were able to enter the world of the white
imperialists and better them at their own game twice. First,
they avoided the slicing up that China suffered and second,
they successfully became an imperialistic power themselves.
of "snapshot" articles and extracts for the period providing
more details on specific periods and incidents.
70ften debated; in this paper, the word feudal is used
in its most liberal sense. Japanese feudalism had its own
distinct characteristics and thus references to a feudal
culture in pre-World War II Japan are liberal in the sense
that they do not follow the European feudal model.
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The West is now "losing" to the Japanese in an economic
world. Will we change the rules again now that the Japanese
have figured them out and are once again beating us at our
own game? Will we be forced to follow a path that may
eventually lead us to war again to prevent Japanese
domination of what has been traditionally Western "turf"?
Having posed this question at an early juncture I
confess that I do not have certain answers. This thesis is
intended to raise an eyebrow- -provoke a second glance- -at an
issue which may be extremely important in the coming years.
It is not a cry of "wolf" (or "keizai dobutsu "
.
8 as the case
may be), merely a note that history has recorded lessons for
us, and it never hurts to review them periodically.
U. S. -Japanese relations in the 1980's are strong, but
nothing is forever. On the contrary, these frictions may
never be an issue in the context of war, but lead us to some
point short of warfare.
Even so, it is my intent to show the Japanese potential
to be, at worst, a belligerent military power. In this
context, a recurring theme is the similarity between the
nationalistic roots of 1930' s militarism and contemporary
nationalism present in the 1980 f s. One might consider these
roots in a contemporary analogy: if nationalism is "the
translated as "economic animal"; the term is sometimes
applied to Japan in a pseudo-humorous fashion.
13
Force" of Star Wars 9 fame, then it has a dark side as well
as a good side. My purpose here is to propose policy which
encourages Japan to move away from the "dark side" of their
nationalism and toward those aspects which make nationalism
a good and progressive force.
C. A LESSON FROM HISTORY
One key lesson from history, predominant in Japanese
thought, is that the Japanese see themselves- -as they have
since Meiji--as the leader in the Pacific. This thought is
evident in items as diverse as the Japanese legends of
creation to the actions of Prime Minister Nakasone in
shaping a greater role for Japan in the international
community. 10 This is embodied, from a racial standpoint, in
their legends and it is clearly seen in their pan-Asianist
9 Star Wars was a major motion picture released in 1977
dealing with a theme of good versus evil in a futuristic
extraterrestrial location. "The Force" is the essence of
life force in the universe whose power is available to those
who can understand it. Those with evil intent were said to
be availing themselves of the "dark side" of the force.
10 See, for instance, Robert K. Hall, ed. Kokutai No
Honei . Translated by John 0. Gauntlett. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1949 (cited hereafter as Hall,
Kokutai ). Note that Emperor Hirohito never acknowledged
defeat- -his message to Japan was that he was "stopping the
war", clearly different from admitting that the nation was
defeated. For more recent indications, see articles such as
"Japanese Prime Minister to Urge Allies to Line Up Behind
Reagan", Christian Science Monitor, 23 Oct 1985; "Nakasone
Seeks an International Japan, Chief Executive 28 (Summer
84): 10-12.; Otsuki Shinji, "Nakasone's New Asian
Diplomacy," Japan Quarterly 31 (July-September 1984):
259-261.
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policy prior to their defeat in World War II. The Greater
East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere 11 had at its roots Japanese
leadership in the Asia/Pacific area. The methods the
Japanese used in implementing this policy of militarism were
a function of the political leanings of the elites at that
time. These elites were brought into power by a combination
of internal and external factors. These factors are
introduced at the beginning of the third chapter.
Of the internal factors, nationalism, as an emotional
conduit, is the factor which concerns this paper. This is
not to say that the issues leading to World War II did not
have economic roots--they most certainly did, especially for
the Japanese. The economic roots of the conflict stemming
from Japan's desire for access to resources are well
documented in history books. The issues in the mid- 1980 T s
seem even more obviously economic, however. Rather than a
tide of Japanese soldiers overrunning Asia, Americans, as
well as other Asians, see a tide of Japanese exports
invading what were formerly considered by Americans to be
American markets. Indeed, today we find our own domestic
markets are the target of Japanese products. The hue and
cry by the U. S. Congress during the spring of 1985 for an
opening of Japanese markets is testimony to the concern that
is felt throughout the United States. While many Japanese
^Referred to hereafter as GEACOPS.
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may have passed this off as the annual spring trade
concessions ritual, 12 Prime Minister Nakasone noted that:
"It is the first time for the U. S. Senate to adopt a
unanimous resolution asking for [Japanese] restraint." 13
Fifty years ago, the United States wanted Japan to
curtail her colonial policies and the military machine
running rampant throughout Asia. Ironically, Japanese
economic interests remain essentially the same in the 80 's
requiring access to raw materials and markets for Japanese
products. The United States is urging Japan to take up arms
hoping, I believe, that the shifting of resources within the
Japanese economy will be more to the U.S. benefit, slowing
Japanese economic growth and perhaps easing the U. S. -Japan
trade imbalance. Naturally, the very real benefits of an
armed and friendly Japan are supportive of U. S. goals
worldwide- -or are they?
There may be very real dangers associated with the
rearming of a nation whose cultural values incorporate
racial superiority and whose economic prowess is expanding
exponentially. The danger is pronounced if the main reason
Japan rearms is U. S. pressure and not consensus both within
Japan and between our two countries. Even a cursory review
12
"Japan Shrugs Off Tough Trade Talk From the U.S.,"
Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly . 8 April 1985, p. 1.
13
"Nakasone Notes U.S. Trade Resolution," Monterey
Peninsula Herald . 31 March 1985, p. 2.
16
of the history of the 1920s and 1930s shows that the
Japanese nation may have been our ally in World War I, but
in the course of only twenty years became our enemy. The
reasons were no more complex than a failure on the part of
the West to recognize Japan as an equal- -this despite
Japan's demonstration of her ability to hold her own with
the major powers, i.e. military defeat of a Western power
(Russia in 1905) and possession of the third largest navy in
the world. Despite these clear demonstrations of national
power by the Japanese, the United States preferred to think
in terms of the impending "yellow peril" and considered the
Japanese to be worthy of only the short end of the 5-5-3
naval ratio set at the Washington Conference in 1921.
D. THE IMPERATIVE OF APPLYING THE LESSON
One cannot live in the past, however. Mistakes are only
valuable if they are applied as lessons. The United States
made the mistake (along with Japan--I don't claim the U.S.
is solely or even mostly responsible for the Pacific War) of
not heeding pre-WWII warning signs and so ended up involved
in a costly war in the Pacific. The lesson to be learned is
clearly that the national interests of other nations cannot
be treated cavalierly in the formulation of one's own
policy. We cannot formulate policy assuming that our
interests are more important to us than Japan's, or any
nation's, interests are to that nation. In our case, we
17
failed to account for the needs of the Japanese in terms of
recognizing them as a major power for the first half of the
20th century. The United States appears not to have learned
the danger pointed out in this lesson. Japan cannot be
treated as a second class citizen. Some might argue that
current U. S. policy reflects a fair and equitable policy for
Japan—that U.S. urging of Japan to rearm is a reflection of
American faith in Japan as an ally. This sounds good but is
not the whole truth. The U. S. appears to be asking Japan
for a more equitable partnership and shared
responsibilities, 14 but I believe the U.S. really wants
another "unequal treaty" or at least an unequal
partnership. 1 5 The irony is that we want it to be "unequal"
in our favor this time. If Japan goes beyond the bounds
which the U.S. sees as healthy or necessary, there will be a
chorus of restraining voices from both the U. S. and a number
14 Dr. Edward Olsen has written concerning conventional
arms equality/parity as a U. S. goal. See his article
"Strengthening Western Alliances: Burden Sharing Via Power
Sharing," Journal of Contemporary Studies 8 (Fall-Winter
1985): 43-58. Cited hereafter as "Power Sharing".
15 01sen, "Power Sharing." Olsen acknowledges the lack
of Japanese influence in the use of her "ally's" nuclear
weapons, and believes this inequality establishes a
conventional limitation on any U. S. -Japan treaty. My
argument is that the U. S. is fully cognizant of Japanese
feelings on nuclear weapons and really has no desire to
share control of these weapons. Thus, any policy which
increases Japanese expenses on conventional weapons and
keeps from them the nuclear trigger is an "unequal treaty"
in our favor.
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of concerned and frightened Pacific nations who have already
experienced what a strong Japan can do.
Without even considering the possible political
implications of a rearmed Japan, the impact of Japanese
intrusion into the arms export business could pose immediate
economic problems. If Japan should decide to arm at levels
in the 3-6% of GNP range, the Japanese may logically seek to
provide their own arms. Large scale production is
economically more efficient and beneficial than purchase.
Their entry into this arena will probably lead to exporting
of- arms, a necessary task for the industry to be efficient.
The topic of arms exports will be discussed in greater
detail in a later chapter. The argument presented there is
significant in terms of weighing the benefits versus the
costs of Japanese economic restructuring caused by U. S.
pressure on Japan to take that course of action. While the
benefits may be valuable in the short term, ultimately they
may prove to be an even greater headache later.
Finally, the United States, faced with global problems,
must plan carefully to assure the best use of Japanese
support in the coming years and prevent unnecessary and
trivial problems from becoming overwhelming issues
separating the two countries. The U. S. must recognize the
growing spirit of nationalism in Japan as a healthy trend
and make it work for us rather than against us.
19
It is in this spirit that I will propose a policy which
accounts for U. S. needs and U. S. goals as well as Japanese
needs and goals. The United States must look down the road
and see the point where our two nations will meet. We need
to anticipate Japanese needs (just as they must anticipate
ours), 16 whether economic or cultural, and plan accordingly.
We cannot afford to turn a blind eye to the forces which are
growing in Japan anymore than we can to the growing threat
in the region and the world.
16 It is entirely possible to interpret PM Nakasone's
actions in the latter part of 1985 and early 1986 as
economic (but not necessarily pecuniary) compensation for
the U. S. defense umbrella.
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II. THE GROWTH OF NATIONALISM AND ULTRANATIONALISM
In a period of between seventy and ninety years,
depending on how one measures, the Japanese nation evolved
from a comparatively backward, feudal, and isolated society
to the militant, belligerent nation which conquered
territory spanning nearly one quarter of the circumference
of the globe from Burma to the Aleutian Islands. A number of
elements were required to accomplish this- -some were
permanent aspects of the culture; some were generated
artificially by the circumstances of the day. The permanent
cultural elements are the key ones.
These key elements— the core cultural elements— do not
change, or they change so slowly as to be undetectable
except when viewed over a millennium. These elements are
functions of the fundamental beliefs of the people
themselves, and reflect the very essence of the nation, its
raison d' etre . In Japan this concept takes on a very special
meaning; the word is kokutai, usually translated as "the
national polity". 17
1 7Richard Storry, The Double Patriots . (London: Chatto &
Windus , Ltd., 1957; reprint ed. , Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press, 1973), p. 5.
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Kokutai is the soul of Japanese society--in it is to be
found the origins of militarism. "National polity", an
English language term, does not begin to fully embrace the
intricacies of religion, loyalty, and duty- -among other
abstractions, which bind the Japanese together and explain
why they act the way they do.
This chapter will tie these intricacies together,
alongside the events of history, and thus explain how
Japanese nationalism led to militarism. Kokutai and the
relevant events of the period from the Meiji Restoration
through 1937 will be surveyed as well as the political
climate and the final accession to power of the right-wing
nationalists. I will show that the kokutai and the growth of
Japanese nationalism only provided °a base upon which
militarism subsequently developed for other reasons.
Three concepts under scrutiny must be
defined- -nationalism, ultranationalism, and militarism. This
is not an easy task. Since their definition is not intended
as the focus of this paper, simple, explicit definitions are
the most expedient and useful. Accordingly, nationalism, 18
18 For two excellent discussions of nationalism, see
Delmer M. Brown, Nationalism in Japan . (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1955), pp. 1-9. and Maruyama
Masao, Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics .
(London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 135-156. See
also Morris, Nationalism , pp. vii-x, and selected readings
throughout this work for a more focused look at nationalism
as a force in transition during the post war period.
22
in general, is defined as the intangible sense of group
loyalty to the ethnic, cultural or geographical group to
which one feels that they belong. Ultranationalism, in a
Japanese context, is the fanatical sense of nationalism
which purports national superiority over all other
nationalities. Militarism is the politically active
dimension of ultranationalism; it is the intangible belief
made manifest through belligerency, political control of the
government by the military, and force of arms --the
manifestation which ultimately led Japan into war.
A. THE NATIONAL POLITY
Japanese nationalism, by the preceding definition, did
not exist prior to 1868. Prior to the Meiji Restoration,
most of the Japanese peasantry were unaware of the existence
of the mikado 19 or, in many cases, the Shogun who ruled in
his name. 20 The feeling of "Japaneseness" simply did not
exist because the common people were not knowledgeable of
their land as constituting a state. If there was any feeling
of "we-they" at all, it was due to local or regional loyalty
to the village samurai or daimvo .
1 9A more archaic term for the Emperor, suitable for the
time frame discussed here.
20 Storry, p. 1.
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This figured prominently in the Meiji Restoration as
loyalties were not automatically cast with the young
Emperor; ties to the land and the family which ruled that
land had been ingrained over hundreds of years. The success
of the Emperor was ultimately the result of the successes in
battle of those families which supported him. It is here
that the real beginnings of nationalism are seen.
The twin battle cries for Imperial supporters were
"Honor the Emperor!" and "Expel the barbarian!" (sonno
ioi ) 21 The men promoting this were not the peasants; rather
they were samurai who were discontented with the progress
and inroads made by the West into Japan. These men were
seeking a return to the traditions of the past. Not
coincidentally , they were also men of the same clans whose
loyalties to the Shoeunate were "earned" in their defeat at
the hands of Tokugawa Ieyasu in the early years of the 17th
century. Earned in the ironic sense that there was no
choice for these clans. They either declared loyalty to the
Shogun or suffered his wrath.
The men who shaped the history of the nation from the
early part of this millennium were the elite. They were, for
the most part, the only ones who, through their governance,
knew of the existence of the "nation". The common man owed
his existence to his immediate lord and not until after the
21 Fairbank, East Asia , p. 494.
24
Meiji Emperor was well entrenched in power was this
changed. 22
This change- came most dramatically in the form of the
Imperial Rescript on Education issued in 1890. This
important document tied together the Confucian ethic and the
Shinto legends of the origin of Japan23 as well as providing
a basis for loyalty beyond the local lord. 24 This document
changed the face of Japanese society significantly because
it centralized the object of the people's political and
religious loyalty into a single entity, the Emperor. It
established the Emperor as the state itself and in so doing
created a base for building nationalism- -loyalty to the
state. Equally important to this development was the
incorporation • of the religious aspects of the culture,
notably Shinto, into the politics of the state.
22The Imperial decrees abolishing samurai privileges are
well documented. The fact that the Meiji Emperor survived
the backlash from these decrees is offered here as de facto
"proof" of the Emperor's entrenchment. Additionally, it
should be noted that direct action to remove the Emperor and
replace him with a more politically agreeable one was not
unknown. During the decline of the Fujiwara regents,
numerous descendants of the Imperial line in competing court
families led to considerable intrigue and efforts by one
family to install their "true" heir to the throne. Most
notable of these is the Gempei War ( ca. 1180-1185). See
George B. Sansom, A, History of Japan to 1334 . (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 289-305.
23Hall, Kokutai . pp. 28, 34.
24 This conclusion is based on Sansom' s statements, p.
363.
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The Shinto beliefs of the people extend back before
recorded history. Shinto is the ancient and indigenous
religion of Japan. Originally an animistic religion, it
provides the legends of the origins of the Imperial line.
Shinto ? s evolution began prior to recorded Japanese history
in a synthesis with Confucianism. Sometime during the Nara
period (8th century), there occurred another synthesis, this
time with Buddhism. This merging was significant for the
acceptance ". . . of the gods of one religion in the
pantheon of the other." 25 This merger was so complete that
the identity of each was virtually lost until the rise of
the Meiji Emperor.
One of the first acts of the Meiji Emperor was to
disestablish the two religions from each other and make
Shinto the State religion. As a reaction to Tokugawa
requirements that Japanese register for census purposes as
Buddhists, Buddhism was particularly hard hit. This
included the elimination of all Buddhist elements and
priests from Shinto shrines. 26 In so doing, the formal
promulgation of the Emperor as the basis for the state was
established. Confucianism provided the basis for loyalty and
piety. The Meiji Emperor, in his rescript, drew upon all
2 5Hall, Kokutai . pp. 27-28.
26John B. Noss and David S. Noss, Man' s Religions . 7th
ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1984), p. 312.
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these and provided the Japanese with the direction they
needed and at the same time established loyalty to the
Imperial throne not just as a filial duty, but as the very
purpose of life itself. 27 As large a step as this may seem,
the Japanese were already well used to giving their loyalty
to members of a higher class; the religious basis offered by
the Emperor actually may have provided a measure of
legitimacy 28 to the Emperor. This shift of loyalty to the
Emperor for quasi-religious and political reasons formed the
basis of what was to become known as "State Shinto" and a
key element of the kokutai .
State Shinto was more than the legislative adaptation of
a particular religion to the State. Its philosophy was drawn
heavily from ". . . the writings of the opponents of Rvobu
Shinto ... [a sect which believed in] an absolute Buddha
and under this a multitude of manifest Buddhas who appeared
from time to time in the form of various gods and goddesses
of other religions." 29 This opposing view to the idea that
"kami" of Shinto belief were merely a subset of the larger
Buddhist pantheon was necessary to establish the supremacy
27Hall, Kokutai . p. 9.
28 The term "legitimacy" is not used in any works
covering this period. It is a Western term, unsuited for
use in Japanese, yet totally appropriate for explanation to
the Westerner.
29Hall, Kokutai . pp. 28-29.
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of the Imperial line rather than allow it to be a lesser to
the "supreme Buddha". This move would clearly disestablish
the Imperial line from Buddhism and preclude conflict with
Japanese legends. In this way, opposition to the adaptation
of State Shinto as the religion of the nation eventually
led, by 1877, to a separation of State Shinto from religion
and its installation as a cult. This separation of State
Shinto from ordinary Shinto 30 focused the adoration of the
elites on to the Emperor and as such became a defacto
"cult". The Meiji government further clarified and
confirmed this in 1882 with the statement ". . . that Shinto
was not a religion, properly speaking, but a formulation of
national ethics and a cult of loyalty to national
institutions. " 31
The result was a nation emerging into the 20th century
with the politically inspired belief in the absolute
divinity 32 of their Emperor, their national soil, and the
3
"Shinto did not focus on one single "kami" but had (and
has) a huge pantheon of gods found throughout nature. State
Shinto did not replace Shinto, it was a facet of the times,
a fad followed by those who felt the rising nationalistic
spirit and who looked to the Emperor as the focal point of
that energy. Those who fear a return to militarism often
cite the official visits to the Yasakuni shrine by
dietmembers as evidence of a State sponsored Shinto.
31 Noss, p. 314.
32Divinity must be clarified at this point. To the
Japanese, their emperor is the symbol of all that is
Japanese. Since all Japanese are descended from the gods,
the emperor could be said to have more of the "stuff" that
28
Japanese people--a nation stepping from feudalism to
nationalism within a generation of men. More than just men,
they were men bred in the ethical code of the warrior,
bushido, owing absolute allegiance to their Emperor. They
were men emerging to find that imperialism was the
international societal norm.
The stage was now set for the rise of the
ultranationalists and the success of the militarists.
B. THE POLITICAL CLIMATE
The international political climate in Asia was
imperialistic. The European nations of the day were
scrambling for colonial holdings in Asia and the grand prize
was China. Japan wasted no time in joining the nations of
the West. Less than twenty- five years after Commodore
Perry's arrival, Japan had opened Korea for trade where the
major Western powers had failed. But had Japan "joined" the
major powers of the world? In terms of recognition as
equals, the answer is an unequivocal "no". Despite Japan's
best efforts, 33 the Western powers regarded Japan as an
makes a Japanese "Japanese. " Divinity in the Christian
sense that the Emperor is "God" is incorrect. A closer
analogy might be that he is the Pope, the most "holy",
although even this entails other connotations which are not
applicable. Thus, the nation entering the 20th century
believed that they were the fruit of their own legends and
myths, not that their emperor was the "God" of all the
world.
33Japan's rise to power was an impressive one. From the
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"Asian" power, and thus second rate. This stigma remained
with Japan until well into World War II and played a major
role in the development of Japanese militarism from the very
beginning. Surprisingly, it was domestic political turmoil
that gave life to the first militant, nationalist
organization.
The Genyosha was the first of many extreme right-wing
organizations to form in Japan. Founded on the island of
Kyushu in 1881, the organization took root in the
traditional area of unrest. Its name, meaning "Dark Ocean
Society" or "Black Sea Straits" made direct reference to the
straits between Kyushu and Korea. The organization was an
amalgamation of existing patriotic associations from the
region but, more importantly, was the legacy of Saigo
Takamori's dream of invading Korea. 34
internal turmoil of the Meiji Restoration, Japan rose to
defeat the Chinese Army in 1895 during the Sino- Japanese
War. This was followed in a decade with the defeat of the
Russians in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. A highly
significant victory, Japan had shown the world that an Asian
power could defeat a "white" power. In spite of this,
Japan's request for a statement of racial equality was
refused at the Versailles Treaty and at the Washington
Conference of 1921, Japan was snubbed with the 5-5-3 naval
agreement. There were other snubs. In 1915, the United
States had formally declared non- recognition of the
Twenty-one Demands and in 1924, the United States
effectively singled out the Japanese for discriminatory (by
present standards) immigration laws.
34 Storry, pp. 9-10. Saigo was certainly not the first
either. Hideyoshi attempted conquest of Korea in the last
few years of the 16th century. His death brought the
invasion to a halt as Japan fell into political turmoil.
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During the early years after the Restoration, rapid
societal changes which impacted heavily upon the Samurai led
to widespread discontent among this class. Isolated plots
against the government were easily subdued until the
decision in 1873 not to invade Korea. There had been a major
faction in favor of war, including Saigo and his clan, and
the political defeat of this prowar faction (among other
reasons) finally led to a series of uprisings including the
Satsuma revolt of 1877. 35 Saigo had spearheaded this revolt
in an effort to rescue the Emperor from the bad advice of
"unfaithful ministers". 36 The Genyosha thus provided a
refuge, of sorts, for the pools of discontented ex-samurai.
The society had three stated goals: "to revere the imperial
family", "to respect and honor the fatherland", and "to
guard strictly the rights of the people." 37 These goals
correspond very closely to those battle cries of the
Restoration and it is little wonder that membership drew
heavily from the patriotic organizations of the region.
Compulsory education, heavily laced with "patriotic ethics"
35 E. Herbert Norman, "The Genyosha: A Study in the
Origins of Japanese Imperialism," Pacific Affairs 17
(September 1944): 262-263.
36 Storry, p. 10.
37 Storry, p. 10.
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was increasing the national consciousness and overseas
expansion was a popular idea, not only within the Genyosha,
but among the rising class of educated 38 and the Army.
The Genyosha developed as an organization for terrorists
and intelligence collection outside of Japan. It is an
important organization because of its ties to the military
and its reflection of the national mood. By 1890, owing to
parallel interests, 39 the Genyosha began to receive covert
funding from the Ministry of War. By the early 1890' s,
Japan felt strong enough to challenge China over what
amounted to the suzerainty of Korea. 40 The close ties
between the Genyosha and the Japanese Army were demonstrated
by the latter providing funding to the Genyosha for
intelligence in the form of translators, maps, guides and
Tonghak 4 l contacts.. It also provided funds through the
38 Storry, p. 14.
39 I refer here to the bomb attack on Foreign Minister
Okuma in late 1889. This was in reaction to press reports of
further treaty concessions about to be made by him. The
diplomatic channels appear to have been too slow for the




41 The Tonghaks were a religious group in Korea whose
extreme xenophobia led to rebellion in 1894 against the
Korean monarchy and precipitated the Sino- Japanese War. See
Woo-keun Han, The History of Korea . (Honolulu, HI:
University of Hawaii Press, 1974), pp. 403-415 for details
of the Tonghaks. See also John W. Sabey, "The Gen'yosha,
the Kokuryukai, and Japanese Expansionism." ( Ph. D
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Genyosha to the Tonghaks to insure their continued agitation
of the situation. When revolt broke out in 1894, the
Japanese used the Tonghak action as an excuse to intervene
and, once in Korea, forced the events which led to the
Sino- Japanese War. 42 The mood in Japan was right for their
development and the men who wielded power were the same ones
who belonged to these organizations. 43 The popular support
demonstrated for these organizations is clear evidence of
swelling nationalism; and from the men who joined,
ultranationalism. The key elements in Japan's development
towards militarism, however, were the contributions of Okawa
Shumei and Kita Ikki , the latter sometimes referred to as
"the founder of Japanese fascism". 44
dissertation, University of Michigan, 1972), pp. 111-138 for
details of Japanese involvement with the Tonghaks.
42 Storry, p. 12. Also see Fairbank, East Asia , pp.
553-554 for the details of the revolt.
4
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0ne notable exception is the Sakurakai. This
particular society was open only to military officers in the
rank of LTC or below. It was an important society in the
1930 's because it was instrumental in linking the Army to
right-wing politics. The aims of the society were to force
the declaration of martial law. Also note, despite its
junior membership, it was sponsored by MG Tatekawa who was
in charge of the Second Division of the General Staff HQ.
This was ". . . possibly the most important single organ of
the Japanese Army; for its function was the planning of
military operations." Storry, pp. 55-56.
44 Storry, p. 37.
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C. THE ACCESSION OF THE RIGHT
Kita Ikki ' s rise to prominence began in the period just
after World War I. His writings were arguments which
justified the taking of territories necessary for Japanese
livelihood and advocated a vigorous military buildup to
support a "bellicose foreign policy". 45 He returned to Japan
from serving as an intelligence officer in China after World
War I under the auspices of another key ultranationalist
figure, Okawa Shumei. They were closely associated with
numerous nationalist societies until 1923 when a quarrel
between them led to Okawa' s resignation from the society in
which they were both members.
Two years later Okawa founded the Gvochisa (Action)
society which Kita also joined. The Gvochisa is important
because it was ". . . the first society to establish a
working relationship with the younger officers of the
army". 46 f sic] Other societies had been on terms with the
military as promoters of nationalist ethics but the Gvochisa
was the first to be heavily involved in politics. 47 A split
in 1927 between Kita and Okawa signaled a similar polarity
in the Army. Kita maintained the following of the most
45 Storry, pp. 37-38.
46 Storry, pp. 37-42.
4 7 Storry, p. 42.
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junior officers 48 while Okawa's associations became much
closer with the more senior officers after his split with
Kita. It was this combination of elements, the Army,
ultranationalist societies and politics which, by 1933,
placed Kita and Okawa into the leadership of opposing, and
powerful, political factions. These two factions were
known, respectively, as the Kodo-ha (also known as the
Koeun-ha or Imperial Forces Faction) and Tosei-ha (Control
Faction). 49
The years between 1932 and 1936 were years of political
intrigue as the two factions wrestled politically for
control of the government. The differences between the
factions have often been categorized as extremist versus
moderate but the truth is more complex. The Kodo-ha viewed
communism as the greatest threat to Japan. It was more
fanatical than the Tosei-ha but not necessarily more
48After 1922, the number of junior officers who were the
sons of commoners rose sharply. The Choshu Clan had
dominated the ranks of the officer corps until World War I.
Storry, pp. 42-43.
49 The former, led by Kita, was much more idealistic. It
should be understood that these men were politicians but
their power came from the support each drew from their
factions of the Army. Note also that the Koeun-ha was a
subset of the Kodo-ha . consisting primarily of the lesser
educated members.
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extreme; both organizations were known to resort to murder
and terrorism. 50 The Tosei-ha was, however, more
conservative, if not cautious; if murder was determined to
be the more politically expedient, the impact would have
been well thought-out before the action was taken. The
Kodo-ha was more likely to act in a spasmodic fashion. 51
50 Storry speculates as to whether Okawa was involved
with the 1928 assassination of Marshal Chang Tso-lin. At the
time, Okawa was regularly in Manchuria for periods up to six
months a year working for the South Manchuria Railway
Company. He also lectured on occasion at General Staff HQ
and was close to COL Kawamoto, the man who planned the
assassination. See pages 43-44.
51 Storry, p. 138. The contrast between the two factions
is best seen in this citation quoted by Storry from Japan'
s
Military Masters by Hollis Lory, (London, 1947) pp.
178-179:
The Kodo-ha was "100% soldier. Hard-boiled sort yet
warm-hearted. Ready to sacrifice rules for personal
sympathy. Cause of Emperor higher than law of the land.
Must make extreme sacrifices to-day to achieve 'direct
rule of the Emperor'. Very strongly believes in divine
origin Imperial House and 'manifest destiny'. Bitter
foe of communism. In private association
hail-fellow-well-met; general associating with private.
Battlefield commanders; no peacetime men. Death in
battle highest honour that can befall a Japanese.
Consider politicians no better than so many 'frogs in a
well'. Believes argument useless. 'I will knock you
down' type. No compromise. White or black; no grey.
In organization like steam-roller. Very restless.
Unhappy in sustained peace. National socialist in their
thinking but confused. Not logical. Two and two do not
make four.
"
The Tosei-ha t however, were "Law abiding. Not so
'pious'. Outward observance of national policy, but not
fanatical. War minister type rather than battlefield
commanders. Capable administrators, diplomats, suave in
manner. Businesslike, possessing relatively clear ideas
36
Describing the events of 1936-37, Reischauer writes:
Young army officers almost brought off a coup d'etat on
February 26, 1936, when they killed a number of
government leaders and seized part of downtown Tokyo,
but, after some indecision, the army and navy commands
suppressed the movement and executed its leaders. The
more moderate element in the army then reimposed sterner
control over its officers and put an end to the
factionalization between the higher officers, which had
become severe in recent years. At the same time, the
1936 incident resulted in another decline in the powers
of the Diet, and in 1937 all party participation in the
cabinet was eliminated under a prime minister who was an
army general. 52
Ultimately, the Tosei-ha emerged as the winner but it was a
victory for naught as the general, Abe Nobuyuki , was aligned
to neither faction. He was, however, the Army's man- -and
that meant war was inevitable. Control of the government
now rested in the hands of the militarists.
What circumstances led to this evolution in nationalism?
Examination of the period reveals five key elements of
Japanese culture which consistently stand out. These
of figures. Realistic. Watch their step. Lay stress
on merit rather than personal sympathy. Respect 'status
quo'. Believe in 'evolution' rather 'revolution'. Pay
due consideration to happiness of individual.
Individual just as important as State. Present life as
important as future. Common sense sort. Pay due
consideration to private property. Believes in wisdom
of co-operating with capitalists and politicians.
Considers international co-operation important. Two and
two make four. "
52 E. 0. Reischauer, The Japanese . (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 99.
37
elements are the roots of militarism and Japanese behavior
during the period and are the subject to which we now turn.
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III. THE ORIGINS OF MILITARISM IN CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT
There is a direct and significant relationship between
one's perceptions of the surroundings and the cultural
environment where one's values and morals are formed and
reinforced. Post-Meiji Restoration Japan emerged into a
world of imperialism; it was the norm for the international
society in Asia. The Japanese concept of the nature of the
international society was formed by observations made upon
entry into that society and based on the cultural imprint of
2000 years. Japan's Confucian outlook on the world presumed
that "seniority" would dictate the pecking order for
nations. It was only natural that Japan desired to
participate as a senior colonial power. Was not Japan the
divine land of the gods?
Emerging from isolation with this newly discovered
nationalistic fervor, Japan was immediately shocked to find
that she could not "play ball". Japan was an "Asian" nation,
a "yellow" nation, and in the eyes of the West, an inferior
nation. It was in the face of these insults that the
patriots of Japan rose to the occasion and ultranationalism
became the salve to put on the wound.
The growth of nationalism itself was a normal and
healthy development. The rejection by the West was reflected
39
in Japan by an intensified feeling of "we-they". This,
equally normal, reaction was further intensified by the
sincerest belief in the kokutai and all the tenants of
racial and cultural preeminence therein. The logical
enhancement of Japanese nationalism was the phenomenon of
ultranationalism. Ultranationalism might have died out on
its own if it had not been supported by the West in the form
of unequal treaties and racial policies. The West fueled the
fire. Given the circumstances of the day--a world war,
imperialism the norm and colonial holdings a measure of
national stature--it was probably inevitable that Japan
would move toward militarism. Given the circumstances, it is
remarkable that the militarists did not come to power
earlier than they did.
This chapter will examine the origins of Japanese
militarism to provide a feel for the potential dynamism of
Japanese nationalism. These elements are assumed to be the
fundamental elements which brought about the rise of the
militarists. These will be compared and contrasted with the
1960's-80's and conclusions will be drawn about the possible
future behavior of the Japanese given the current U. S.
policy direction. Each of the origins of militarism cited
will be viewed in a contemporary context. In so doing, the
importance of Japanese nationalism as a potential source of
internal national strength will emerge.
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There appear to be five elements gleaned from the last
chapter which comprised the origins of militarism in prewar
Japan. These elements are the Emperor System, 53 the
kokutai
. or belief in cultural superiority, the presence of
a large and powerful military, the "rules" of behavior for
nations, and a series of actions by Western powers which
were perceived in Japan as racial slurs and insults to the
Japanese people and their emperor. In this section each of
these elements will discussed in historical and current
context. Parallels past and present will be highlighted to
justify conclusions concerning the potential for damage to
U. S. -Japanese relations.
A. THE INSTITUTION OF THE EMPEROR
Prior to the Japanese defeat in World War II the Emperor
served a very different function than he presently serves.
For over twenty- five centuries the unbroken imperial line
served almost exclusively as the titular head of Japan while
true power rested with either a military commander, a
regent, or a group of advisors to the Emperor. 54 The Meiji
53The prewar Emperor System ended with the Imperial
Rescript of 1 January 1946. The postwar "Emperor System" is
one of a constitutional monarch behind whom the nation
remains loyal.
54 Beginning with Jimmu, supposedly the first mortal
emperor, in 660 BC. In theory, the unbroken line goes back
considerably further when deities are included. I decline to
argue the "titular" aspects of gods, however. See Chikafusa
Kitabatake, A Chronicle of Gods and Sovereigns . trans. by
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Restoration placed Mutsuhito into the relatively strongest
position of any emperor in modern Japan and revealed the
existence of the Emperor to the greater part of Japan.
Thus, the societal proclivity of loyalty toward an immediate
superior was superceded by the duty now borne toward the
Emperor. The establishment of State Shinto and the Imperial
Rescript on Education of 1890 institutionalized this
relationship between the Japanese and their Emperor. 55
The cultural aspects of this relationship remain intact
into the 1980 f s despite the defeat of the Japanese nation.
The primary reason for this appears to be the natural
integration of the concept of the kokutai as espoused by
State Shinto and Japanese nationalism. The change in the
Emperor's status has had little impact on the cultural
relationship between the Emperor and his people. 56
H. Paul Varley. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980),
pp. 84-88. Despite occurrences of multiple claimants to the
throne, today's emperor has essentially the same blood
flowing in his veins as his predecessor 2,000 years ago
(albeit somewhat enriched by intermarriage with the
daughters of regents and advisors.
)
55 Storry, p. 1.
56 Several sources discuss this in roundabout terms.
Storry states, in his discussion of Japanese nationalism,
that the national character is composed of ". . . three
elements- -loyalty to the Throne [ sic] , sense of mission, and
belief in the possession of superlative inborn
qualities . . . .
" , p. 5. Although dated (1957) the context
of Storry 's statement indicates an "absolute" feeling of the
people for their Emperor- -something that cannot be changed
by mere decree. Their own history has shown them the
susceptibility of the Emperor to bad advice. Morris
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The Emperor as an entity and as a concept is the single
most important aspect of the Japanese raison d'etre. Should
national honor (as well as personal honor) be found to be
the wellspring from which a Japanese consensus on security
issues will flow, 57 it may well be the restoration of the
Emperor as a divine 58 entity that will provide the catalyst
discusses nationalism and refers to the feeling of Japanese
for their Emperor in less explicit terms: ". . . the
outstanding popularity in recent years of . . . [visiting
shrines associated with nationalistic feelings] cannot
simply be dismissed as a result of improved economic
conditions; it is undoubtedly to some extent an expression
of a renascent 'home consumption' nationalism and of [the]
growing mood of vague nostalgia for prewar patterns.
Devotion to the Emperor symbol is a similar indication of
'home consumption' nationalism . . . [and] a steady rise in
enthusiasm, though very different, be it added, from the
awestruck attitude of prewar days [has occurred in the
postwar period].", pp. 134-135. Finally Halliday and
McCormack, in discussing education, refer to revisions of
textbooks citing one trend (among many) which- is (and are)
indicative of official thinking in the late 60 's: "Avoid any
mention of the Emperor's declaration that he is a mere human
(and not divine)." Jon Halliday and Gavan McCormack,
Japanese Imperialism Today . (New York: Monthly Review Press,
1973), pp. 187-188.
57Kataoka appears to be saying this when he discusses
the predicament of the Jews in World War II. He cites their
"submission" to the holocaust as a function of their lack of
a tangible "public arena" in which to exercise their
"political virtue. " He goes on: "A key ingredient in that
virtue would be a sense of honor and self-respect . . . . "
Later he adds, ". . . [Japan] may have to develop a sense of
honor before she can meet her security needs . . . . "
Kataoka, Tetsuya, Waiting for a Pearl Harbor . (Stanford, CA:
Hoover Institution Press, 1980), pp. 23, 51. Cited
hereafter as Waiting .
58 Divine in terms of being the ultimate Japanese "kami".
His present status as a mere human denigrates not only the
institution of the emperor but the entire nation as well
since the emperor remains the spiritual head of the nation.
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for this consensus to occur. The Japanese have a state and a
nation as defined in contemporary Western terms, but in
Japanese minds it is a hollow entity because the true
Japanese nation is psychologically divine. The Emperor is
the focus of loyalty and honor in Japanese hearts.
There seems to be a tacit understanding of this among
elites in Japan. In the decades since the war there have
been intermittent references to resurging Japanese
ultranationalism but they have been isolated and largely
considered anachronistic. 59 Despite this, the "demand that
the 'symbolic emperor' be restored to his former status as
59 Examples include Mishima's celebrated writings, his
cult of followers (the Shield Society) as well as his take
over of SDF headquarters to call for a return to militarism
and his subsequent ritual suicide. Additionally, the
textbook controversy of the early 1980 's sparked
considerable controversy among Asian neighbors that Japan
was making a move to cover up past indiscretions and move
toward the prewar spirit. The 'Kimigayo' incident of the
early 1980 's in Fukuoka prefecture demonstrated the rising
patriotic feeling and its impact on the educational system.
See Edwin P. Hoyt , The Militarists (New York: Donald I.
Fine, 1985), pp 131-135. for a description of the event.
Proposals within the Ministry of Education that schools
provide instruction in patriotic ideals has been proposed on
several occasions (see Soviet Threat Forces Pacifist Japan
to Debate the Meaning of Patriotism," Christian Science
Monitor, 4 September 1980, p. 6.) Other examples include
the writings of Shimizu Ikutaro, Hori Yukio, and Nakagawa
Yasuhiro , the latter considered to be a good example of
young right wing opinion by Dr. Kenneth B. Pyle, a noted
professor of Japanese nationalism. In a conversation with
Dr. Pyle in early May 1986, he noted a trend in right wing
tactics toward building grassroots support for their ideas.
He cited attempts to place the issue of using the Japanese
calendar rather than the western calendar on local
prefectural agendas as an example of such political
activity.
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sovereign monarch has some powerful supporters among the
LDP, who have long wanted to remove or revise these parts of
the Constitution." 60 With the growing emphasis by the United
States for Japanese participation in an American security
program, these ideas may be taking root- -why fight if there
is nothing to fight for? The embodiment of the nation
remains the Emperor, but in a "purgatorial" suspension.
Patriotism cannot flourish without the object d'etat.
Without patriotism the Japanese as a nation will not condone
a military buildup to the point of being an offensive
capable power. 61 Should the Emperor be restored to his
former status, perhaps expenditures on military and defense
related items will increase also. Regardless, the U.S. does
not need to rush Japanese defense expenditures; the Japanese
will eventually rearm to a point of significant military
capability. If it is done for reasons which are mutually
agreeable, their military power will serve to strengthen the
alliance.
B. NATIONAL SUPERIORITY
As Storry pointed out in his elements of national
character, 62 the Japanese belief of their "possession of
60 Kudo Yoroshi, "Showa Perspectives," Japan Quarterly 32
(January-March 1985): 39.
6 Emphasis on "capable". Japan's present goal is, of
course, defense of Japan.
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superlative inborn qualities" is a fundamental part of the
kokutai . The 1946 government claim that the kokutai has not
changed despite the wartime defeat may be difficult to
accept forty years later, but there are enough contemporary
sources which indicate this to be the case. 63 Whether or not
one believes that the Japanese subscribe to the kokutai is
an enormously important issue. 64 The policy implications for
the United States in nurturing a nation of racists 65 has not
62 Storry, p. 5.
630r at least that a revival of this belief has
occurred. See, for instance, Ezra F. Vogel, Japan as Number
One . (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), pp. 241-244. , Herman
Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate . (Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 54. , and Edwin 0. Reischauer,
The Storv of A Nation . (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970),
pp. 295-296. Still others refer to this in explicitly racial
terms; see Selig Harrison, The Widening Gulf . (New York: The
Free Press, 1978), pp. 431-433. and Frank Gibney's
discussion of the Japanese intelligentsia in Japan : The
Fragile Super Power . revised ed. (New York: New American
Library, 1979), pp. 240-242.
64 See Hall, Kokutai . p. 198. In a furnished passage
from "Exposition on the New Constitution" published by the
Japanese Imperial Cabinet, November 1946, is stated: "The
term 'national entity' can mean many things, but it is
appropriate to interpret its correct meaning as 'basic
characteristics of the nation'. So interpreted, national
entity forms the foundation of the nation's existence, and
its destiny is common with that of the State; so that if
this national entity were to suffer change or loss, the
State would at once lose its existence. . . . When we look
upon national entity in this way and in its relation to our
country, we can say that in a word it means the immutable
and solemn fact that the Japanese people look up to their
Emperor as if he were the center of their adoration, on the
basis of the link that deep down in their hearts binds them
to him, that the entire nation is united thereby, and that
this forms the basis of Japan's existence."
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only moral overtones, but far more importantly, carries an
intrinsic danger which must be prepared for well in advance.
The U. S. must recognize the potential of the Japanese to
find justification for the return of neo-ultranationalists
who could lead Japan away from ties with the U.S. and even,
however unlikely, toward a new era of militarism. However
unlikely a return to militarism may seem in the mid 1980' s,
Japan has become a superpower in its own right. Other
alternatives notwithstanding, Japanese leadership may
eventually realize that ultimately only military force can
resolve unrelenting conflicts between the national interests
of two nations. If so, Japan will most likely see that it
is in her interests to rearm for her own good and not just
for the good of the United States. If at this point the
U. S. has maintained a relationship with Japan which
demonstrated a respect for Japanese interests, the
subsequent remilitarization of Japan will be to our mutual
benefit and not present the potential ramifications of
65 I am not arguing that the Japanese are, in the 1980' s,
the kind of rabid, racist individuals which terrorized
minorities in the U. S. over the past century. I am pointing
out a fact (that racism is inherent in the Japanese
Confucian outlook and legends) and bringing light on this
fact insofar as I mention that such an interpretation (as
the latter one) was accurate during the 1930 's. It could be
a factor in current or future Japanese thinking, even if
deeply buried.
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damaged U. S. -Japanese relations. The U. S. can benefit from
Japan re-learning the necessity of arms on her own; we risk
jeopardizing our relationship by being too heavy-handed.
C. MILITARY POWER
There are many differences in the military of Japan in
1940 and the 1980 's. Political intrigue, strength,
motivation, prestige— these come to mind immediately. Of all
the differences, the biggest difference which currently
exists between the prewar and postwar militaries is the
degree of political power and sway held. The current
Japanese military is divorced from the political sphere.
Given that civilian control of the government as established
by the Japanese constitution remains firm, the danger of
resurgent Japanese military power is not so much what the
military might do on its own but the fact that the military
power exists and is at the disposal of the Japanese
political hierarchy.
Given a situation of increased political disillusionment
over U.S. policies, a contemporary Mori Kaku seems quite
feasible. 66 As a civilian politician, he did not want to see
660f the numerous key actors in the prewar period, Mori
Kaku is one of the more significant, yet least known,
actors—probably because of his relatively early death in
1932. It was he who led the arguments for right wing
political control of the government of Japan. Mori Kaku
figures prominently in the activities of the Kwantung Army
and his ideas paved the way for the later formal policy
engendered by the GEACOPS. See Ian Nish, Japanese Foreign
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the government controlled by the military as it ultimately
was, but rather wanted a strong government to use the
military to promote a policy of continental advance. A man
of similar leanings could prove to be quite palatable 67 to a
Japan weary of domineering rhetoric and insensitive,
unceasing demands from a nation (the United States) which it
has eclipsed economically and militarily. 68 Nakasone
Yasuhiro might fit this mold but his political problems
indicate that he is on the scene too early. As his faction
expands in the latter half of the 1980 ? s and into the 1990'
s
(a very likely course of action if Takeshita Noboru and
Nikaido Susumu split the Tanaka faction with in- fighting)
Nakasone ? s behind the scenes influence will likely increase.
As Japanese nationalism grows stronger and the recurring
question of constitutional revision (not only to redress the
status of the emperor, but also the provisions of Article
Policy . 1869-1942 . (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977),
pp. 153, 161, 164, 180. For greater detail on his activities
see also Yoshihashi Takehiko, Conspiracy at Mukden . (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1963) and Lynn Gordon
Triplett, "Mori Kaku 1883-1932: A Political Biography,"
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Arizona, 1974).
67In terms of advocating a strong military under
civilian control- -not necessarily continental advance
policies.
68 A hypothetical future for the military- -perhaps not so
hypothetical, nor futuristic, in economic terms. The thrust
of this point is to note that Japanese military power could
be increased for reasons not wholly in the interests of the
United States. A rising nationalistic trend and anti-U. S.
fervor would closely parallel prewar conditions.
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IX) becomes more frequent, Japan may find fewer reasons why
she should remain a nation disenfranchised from all the
sovereign rights of other nations. It is not necessary that
they be provoked into full-scale rearmament --only that they
question why they cannot rearm. Combined with other events,
this may provide the incentive for constitutional revision.
Again, the revision to allow a warmaking capability is not
an inherently bad thing and should not be viewed as such.
The reason that Japan feels the need to attain this posture
is the crux of this thesis.
D. THE INTERNATIONAL 'NORM'
As the Japanese emerged from isolation in the second
half of the nineteenth century, they realized the importance
of the West to their own growth and survival. Japan
recognized her vulnerability resulting from a lack of modern
knowledge. The Japanese sent multiple missions abroad to
study the West and bring back the knowledge and technology
necessary to bring Japan on par with the greater nations of
the day.
Quickly apparent was the imperialistic behavior of the
West. Although immediate Japanese goals were to prevent
falling prey to the Western nations as China had, it was not
long before Japan secured her position and became interested
in participating in the colonial competition of the West.
Colonial holdings provided markets and resources for the
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nations who possessed the capability to produce finished
goods. The British provided a perfect example of an island
nation, short of natural resources, yet powerful in the
world. Asia was being invaded by colonial powers and Japan
saw no reason why she should not participate as well. In
rapid succession Japan opened Korea for trade, defeated the
Chinese over de facto suzerainty of Korea, and established
an alliance with Britain, the premier sea power.
The pattern in the postwar period has been factually
different yet thematically the same. Rather than emerging
from a self-imposed isolation Japan has emerged from postwar
devastation and rapidly emulated the behavior of her postwar
mentor, the United States. Economic power and domination of
world trade patterns by the United States has been observed
and adopted just as Western colonial behavior was in the
Meiji period.
The result of this is seen today, in the mid-80' s in the
growing trade surplus which Japan has with the rest of the
world and, quite possibly, as a ". . . critical turning
point when Japan surpasses the United States as the dominant
economic power in the world.
"
69 In the postwar era Japan has
69 Ezra Vogel as quoted in "Japan May Pass U.S. This
Year, Expert Says," Monterey Peninsula Herald . 28 May 1985,
p. 11. Although quoted out of context, Vogel 's point is
valid here. The point of his statement in the article
concerned American complacency as the primary reason for the
decline of American economic power in relation to Japan.
Regardless of the reason for the relative decline, my point
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challenged the West in an economic war and at the moment
seems to be winning. The world of imperialism and colonial
holdings at the beginning of this century has evolved into a
world where interdependence, rather than deterrence alone,
maintains order- -at least as the Japanese see it.
Certainly deterrence has added to the stability of the
international system; mutual annihilation benefits no one.
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to speculate on
where strategies of deterrence are leading, it is to the
point to speculate on one possible impact of the U. S.
pressures on Japan to take a greater role in the "Western"
defense. The Japanese view of this pressure could easily
become one of resentment given other conditions. The U. S.
propensity to assume our allies will subordinate their own
national interests and goals to ours wreaks of "little brown
brotherism". Since the Japanese see their policy of peace 70
to be not only national but global in terms of saving the
world to a better way, to them the U.S. assumes too much.
For the U. S. to make this assumption is another straw on the
proverbial camel's back which will make it that much harder
for the Japanese to continue on their idealistic track and
that much easier for Japan to find fault with the U. S; that
is concerned with it only as a potential fact; Vogel has
eloquently said it for me.
7
"Referring again to the GEACOPS (of the past), the
Global 'New Deal' and the concept of Comprehensive Security.
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could lead to a rift in relations. The Japanese look to
peace now, but they may eventually discover a need to have a
warmaking capability. Our relationship with Japan must not
be the reason, in any negative sense, that Japan feels the
need to rearm.
E. "SLAPS IN THE FACE"
The final element comprising the origins of militarism
concerns the failure of the West and the U. S. to recognize
Japan as a nation deserving of equal international stature.
Early Japanese successes in establishing Japan as a world
power were met with little fanfare in the West. The defeat
of the Russians in 1905 proved to be significant in two
respects. First, it was the first defeat of a major
Western, white, nation by an Asian, yellow, nation. The
Japanese knew it; the Western powers knew it. But the
Japanese did not receive the recognition they felt was due
them- -this combined with other events 71 led to the second
and most significant result of Western failure to see Japan
as an equal.
71 Such as the triple intervention (1895), the
Gentleman's Agreement of voluntary emigration limits on
Japanese going to the U.S. and Hawaii (1908), Secretary
Bryan's note of non-recognition of the Twenty-one Demands
(1915), the failure of the West to include statements of
racial equality in the Versailles Treaty as requested by
Japan (1919), the unequal 5-5-3 Naval agreement (1922), the
exclusion of Japanese immigrants (1924); the list is
virtually endless.
53
The Japanese view of their role in Asia began to assume
a different hue after the Washington Conference of 1921-22.
The Taisho period produced an internal political climate
conducive to the growth of untranationalist thought and
ultranationalist political activity. 72 As the succession of
slaps at the Japanese continued and the ultranationalists
became more outspoken, the concept of Japan's "divine" role
in Asia began to evolve from one of participation with the
West in slicing up Asia to one of leading Asians in the
fight of "Asia for the Asians".
Is the West and/or America still slapping Japan in the
face? Effrontery to pride is a matter of perception. Pride
cannot be wounded, as Kataoka suggests, 73 if there is no
pride to wound. In the past few years there have been no
72Perhaps arguable. My position is that the Taisho
period was one of a weak and sick emperor who took little
interest (indeed, was largely unable to take interest) in
the State and thus left his advisors to manage. Granted that
the historical role of the emperor has not been political,
this was a significantly different state of affairs from the
stronger Meiji emperor who preceded and was a significant
political actor. With a virtual power vacuum, the growth
and policies of the Japanese government became an incestuous
affair. The young Hirohito was not prepared to deal with
this upon his ascension to the throne. See Leonard Mosley,
Hirohito : Emperor of Japan . New York: Prentice-Hall, 1966
for a excellent description of imperial interaction with the
government during these years.
73 I am drawing a conclusion based on his theme in
Waiting . During a conversation with Professor Kataoka in
May 1986, I understood him to confirm this through remarks
about the status of the Emperor, defense of Japan, and other
topics.
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insults to Japan as the U.S. has perceived- -certainly
nothing on the scale of the prewar insults that in hindsight
seem so obvious and foolish. Although these perceptions of
mutual goodwill would seem to be borne out by public opinion
polls, 74 mood swings on a national scale can occur virtually
overnight if the situation dictates. 75 Despite our current
good relationship, there are enough skeletons in the closet
to sully our relationship if the Japanese found it
politically expedient to do so. 76
74
"In a December 1983 poll, the U.S. ranked first among
fifteen countries as the best liked, the most trustworthy,
and the most important nation to Japan. " United States
Information Agency, Office of Research, Japanese Public'
s
Attitudes on Security Issues : 1984 Update . by James S.
Marshall, Research Report R-13-84, (Washington, D. C. : U.S.
Government Printing Office, May 1984), p. 2. (This report is
one of a series of reports by USIA. They will be cited




75 Fads are well documented in Japan as they are in most
cultures. Some fads are political, for instance the mood
swing in Japan toward the Soviets after the KAL 007
shootdown. Some are social, like the Pink Ladies. Still
others are cultural, like the post-Meiji "pro-western" fads.
Any number of popular magazines, or TV shows such as "This
Week in Japan" reflect and report the current vogue in
music, dress, and style. USIA documents trends in opinion
through their polling and compilations of Japanese polls.
76 For instance, the introduction of nuclear weapons into
Japan on U.S. vessels stationed there; the pressure by the
U. S. on Japan to have Japan commit military forces outside
of Japan despite Japan's avowed determination to keep such
forces on Japanese soil; U.S. accusations of a Japanese
"free ride" on defense despite the fact that the U. S.
established the conditions for such a situation to exist;
U.S. protectionist measures against Japanese products; U.S.
attempts to damage the fragile Japanese domestic citrus and
beef industries by political arm-twisting; again, the list
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F. THE COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY GAMBIT
In the end it appears that the U. S. is poking at what
might be a hornet's nest. Our policy in the mid-80 's of
pressuring Japan for greater defense spending presents too
many opportunities for a deterioration of future
Japanese-U. S. relations. For the time being, however, the
Japanese have given us an alternative policy proposal in
Comprehensive Security. It does little to truly offset the
increasing Soviet threat but it has provided both sides with
something concrete to work on in terms of a defined formal
policy; for the Japanese it is an opening position. For the
U. S. it is a sign of a weakness in the Japanese armor of
vulnerability. 77 If the Japanese are concerned enough with
the Soviet Union to recognize them as a threat 78 then we
of "alleged" U. S. "offenses" against Japan could go all the
way back to the "forcing" on the Japanese of a U. S.
designed constitution contrived to strip them of their
sovereign right to arms. Consider also these public opinion
survey results: in a country that perceives trade to be
absolutely essential to its survival, only 10% of
respondents in a 1983 survey stated that U. S. economic
policies and actions were helpful to Japan while 33%
believed them to be harmful. In a 1982 survey, the results
were similar--20% believing them to be helpful and 40%
believing them harmful. In both surveys, there was a
significant "I don't know" contingent. USIA, R- 19-83, p.
X-l.
77Their "armor of vulnerability" is the argument that by
being a threat to no one, no will threaten them. Thus, they
need no defense—in effect, "the best defense is no
offense".
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have taken a step toward each other in security policy. The
real gain, though, will be in the fact that the step will
have been made by mutual concurrence-- Japan feeling as
though she has made the decision in her own interests and
not as part of a trade-off requiring subordination of her
goals to preserve U. S. -Japanese ties.
These were the reasons the militarists found the support
to come to power and these were the origins of Japanese
militarism in the 1920 's. These elements form the basis for
the theme which is the key to this entire analysis. They
formed the roots of Japanese ultranationalism in the 1930 ? s
and, for the most part, form the basis of modern Japanese
nationalism although not all the elements are present in the
1980 's in the same form.
Is there application today? Of the elements listed
above, the two most important remain in existence- -the
Emperor and the kokutai. 79 These form the core for the
78
"The Soviet Union has been building its military
strength consistently, and ... a latent threat against
Japan has increased due to the remarkable buildup of Soviet
forces in the Far East and the intensification of related
activities." Defense of Japan . 1984 . (Tokyo: 1983), p. 3.
79A 1946 publication by the Japanese Cabinet stated that
the kokutai had not undergone any change despite the defeat
of Japan in World War II. Hall, Kokutai, p. 47. The
contemporary aspects of kokutai are today debated under the
name nihoni inron or "discourse on the Japanese man. " The
translation, "the question of Japanese identity" is perhaps
looser, but more descriptive. Nihoni inron is significant in
that through it's mere existence as an ongoing debate by
Japanese about who and what they are, it points out that
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country; the others are transient and changeable month by
month. If there is a reason to be fearful of Japanese
nationalism becoming a hostile factor in U. S. -Japanese
relations, it is to be found in contemporary occurrences of
the transient elements. The prognosis must be based on the
international society of today, not yesterday. Those who
fear a rearmed Japan are short-sighted; the arms are not the
problem, the reason that nation feels the need to arm may
be.
U. S. policy must not push the Japanese to the point of
becoming a military power if they are not ready. This only
serves to exacerbate already strained relations. The U. S.
must adopt a policy which "leads" the Japanese (in a
they acknowledge, at least subconsciously, that there is a
difference between themselves and other races and
nationalities. Japanese, as well as western, authors
continually note the unique aspects of Japanese culture in
their writings on this topic. This proclivity to return to
the uniqueness of the Japanese confirms the existence of the
kokutai . Long time nihon i inron specialist, Watanabe
Shoichi, writes: "At a subconscious level, we [the
Japanese] know that our cultural roots are deep and our
national identity is secure." Watanabe Shoichi, "Hirohito's
Long Reign Underpins Japan's Prosperity," Asian Wall Street
Journal . 6 May 1985, p. 15. For additional comments on this
topic, see the book reviews in Far Eastern Economic Review :
Ian Buruma's "The War on Modernity", 6 February 1986, pp.
46-48 and William Wetherall's "Talking to Crickets", 1 May
1986, pp. 43-44. Wetherall's review of Tsunoda Tadanobu's
book The Japanese Brain points out the immense popularity of
Tsunoda 's work in Japan. Tsunoda 's theories would seem to
support the existence of the strong prejudices congruent
with the kokutai in it's original form. Further, the
popularity of his books indicates an interest in his
theories if not agreement.
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convergent sense, not a leadership sense) so that our policy
accommodates both countries' future needs--not just U.S.
short-term goals. Such a convergent policy must be
far-sighted enough to allow U. S. goals to be supported by
the Japanese as they become stronger. It cannot be a
continuous series of short-sighted steps that will only lead
to increased frustration and friction between Japan and the
United States. Policy options will be discussed further in
later chapters. It is to nationalism and modern Japanese
thinking that we now turn our attention.
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IV. 1980' S NATIONALISM AND COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY
Following defeat in the Pacific War Japan entered into a
period of intense soul-searching and postwar rebuilding.
This chapter will examine the implications for U. S.
policymakers, in light of a growing Japanese nationalistic
sentiment, of Japanese thinking on national security in the
1980' s. As the global environment has changed so, too, has
Japan's perception of her role in the world. The fundamental
belief in national destiny has not disappeared, however,
only lain dormant for several decades while Japan rebuilt
her economic infrastructure.
This fundamental belief is not necessarily one of
racist 80 superiority, although the legends most certainly
indicate this. It is not an ingrained aggressiveness aimed
at world conquest. It is however, a belief in a manifest
destiny, much the same as our own 19th century doctrine.
Japanese manifestations of this sense of national destiny
resulted in aggression during the early part of the 20th
century and led to a reevaluation of the fluid environment
of the late 20th century.
8
"The American Heritage Dictionary defines a racist as
one who harbors notions that "one's own ethnic stock is
superior". Since Japanese legends maintain the divinity of
the Japanese people and islands, as opposed to rest of the
world, they are racist.
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This reevaluation has led to a conceptual change in the
focus of Japanese security. The concept of security via
military power has evolved into one of security via global
economic interdependence. The embodiment of this focus is
the policy of Comprehensive Security 81 which Japan proposed
formally in 1980. Comprehensive Security is an important
statement by the Japanese concerning their role in the world
but its importance is best seen as a reaction to the
Japanese perception of the global environment. This
perception is largely the product of the Japanese cultural
experience and security experience of the half- century prior
to World War II, especially the prewar years of 1920-1940
discussed in the last chapter.
The significance of Comprehensive Security in relation
to U. S. interests in the Pacific and the world is the focus
in this section. A clear theme which will emerge is that
the Japanese find in their culture the elements of a
socially and culturally superior race which has the duty and
the right (as they see it) to help their global neighbors.
This was the underlying premise of the "GEACOPS"; it is the
underlying theme of the "Global 'New Deal'", 82 and
81 See Robert W. Barnett, Bevond War : Japan' s Concept of
Comprehensive National Security . Washington, D. C:
Pergamon-Brassey ' s , 1984. A detailed analysis of the policy
may be gleaned by the reader from the numerous opinions he
has provided from a large number of key Japanese and
American policymakers.
61
Comprehensive Security as a symbolic statement clearly
reflects a growing Japanese nationalism and leadership role
in global affairs.
This theme of social, cultural and racial superiority is
so closely related to nationalism as to be indistinguishable
from it. It is for this reason that pressure should not be
brought upon Japan to subordinate their stated goals to
those of the United States. We should instead recognize the
potential strength of Japanese nationalism and consider
Comprehensive Security at face value as an acceptable policy
for the time being. This demonstration of respect can only
be a step toward strengthening the ties that bind us and
away from antagonizing the Japanese psyche.
A. COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY
The Japanese see themselves as a large population living
on a small group of islands devoid of natural resources.
They must, therefore, work very hard to insure that the
nation can trade in the international system. Comprehensive
Security is the vehicle by which Japan has determined it can
mollify its domestic political constraints against
militarism, satisfy domestic cultural egoism as to Japanese
duty, satisfy international concerns about a revival of
82For an explanation of this, see Barnett, pp. 139-142.
See also his source, Asiaweek . "A Global 'New Deal'," 10
June 1983, pp. 28-29.
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Japanese militarism, and accomplish its economic goals
simultaneously. It "is a Japanese term intended to describe
how Japan should help to forestall, to prevent, or to limit
war." 83 Simultaneously, it is condemned both in the U.S. and
Japan as a smokescreen behind which the Japanese avoid
committing themselves to defense expenditures commensurate
with U.S. desires, and avoid antagonizing their Asian
neighbors while improving their economy.
The true purpose behind Comprehensive Security will not
be debated here as the true purpose, whatever it may be, is
not germane to the point. Specifically, it matters not what
the Japanese really intend by Comprehensive Security, only
that we base our action on what they say is the purpose of
Comprehensive Security. To do otherwise invites
recriminations from the Japanese that we are attempting to
impose our will on Japan. Rather, Comprehensive Security
will be examined here partially as a pawn, not so important
on it's own merit, which it has, but as a line which Japan
has drawn in the dirt and which we must not step over. This
doesn't mean we must naively take everything at face value.
Far from it, we must base our policy and action
realistically but give as much support as possible in the
public eyes, working behind the scenes if necessary to reach





Although formal study was begun in 1979 by Prime
Minister Ohira, the concept of a security policy couched in
non-military terms --indeed, in almost purely economic terms,
has been the thrust of Japanese foreign policy since the end
of the war. 84 The Japanese have determined that security
means "protecting the people's life from various forms of
threat." 85 and they have structured their foreign policy to
achieve this national goal by working at three levels. These
three levels of effort are "to turn the overall
international environment into a favorable one",
"self-reliant efforts to cope with threats", and "to create
a favorable international environment within a limited scope
while protecting security in solidarity with countries
sharing the same ideals and interests." 86 Two aspects of
this policy pose potential challenges to the United States,
one directly and the other in a passive manner.
84 Donald Hellmann says "Japan's approach to the issue of
security has been that of an expanding international trade
company, not that of a nation-state." He then adds "In
this . . . vision of global affairs, economics and politics
are seen as separable, and armament and power are rejected
as critical ingredients for a successful foreign policy.
"
and "The assumptions on which this dimension of Japanese
foreign policy rest are . . . perpetuated by the singularly
salutary international economic relations that prevailed [in
the postwar period] . " Donald C. Hellmann, "Japanese Security
and Postwar Japanese Policy," in The Foreign Policy of
Modern Japan . ed. Robert A. Scalapino (Berkeley, CA:




The direct challenge is actually the lesser threat. It
concerns the second level of effort, "self- reliant efforts
to cope with threats." Given Japan's extraordinary potential
for manufacture of arms, it may be assumed that Japan will
produce the weapons she needs for herself rather than
purchase them. 87 A Japanese arms buildup might resolve
short-term U. S. -Japanese trade imbalances but in the long
run could cause even greater economic imbalance between us.
A Japanese arms buildup may alter the regional balance of
power and economically change the face of the U.S. 's and the
world's arms industries.
The "passive" challenge results from the primary
Japanese effort, "to turn the overall international
environment into a favorable one. " How could this represent
a threat to the United States? To the Japanese this means
establishing economic interdependence on a global scale to
reduce the feasibility of war. To the United States it means
that Japan will continue to resist U. S. efforts to
influence Japanese thinking on defense issues. The passive
or backlash effect is that the United States, in its present
policy direction, will continue to push Japan toward a goal
that the U. S. sees to be in both our interests but which
Japan sees to be counter to its interests. Thus, the U.S.
8
7
This potential will be the subject of a hypothesis in
the next chapter.
65
leaves itself open to charges of dominating and browbeating
Japan- -perfect ammunition for a rising nationalistic or
ultranationalistic movement to use against the United
States.
This is not to say or even imply that such a sentiment
would lead to a return of militarism. This is a different
age and militarism in its 1930 's form is highly unlikely.
Nationalistic feelings can manifest themselves in many ways,
militarism being only one. Even so, in terms of a potential
threat to U. S. security posed by this policy of
Comprehensive Security, the rousing of Japanese nationalism
against the United States (caused by the U.S. stepping over
that "line" that Comprehensive Security represents) is a far
greater danger than the possible economic repercussions, bad
though they may be, of a viable and competitive Japanese
arms industry, a topic to be explored at length in the next
chapter.
B. NATIONALISM AND COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY
As Japan recognizes her growing status as an economic
superpower, she becomes more proud and more willing to do
more in the world. Japan sees for herself a comparable
manifest destiny in the world just as the United States saw
for itself in the Pacific in the latter part of the 19th
century. Comprehensive Security is only a stepping stone- -an
intermediate step toward a more clearly delineated policy of
Japanese leadership in global affairs.
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As Japanese pride increases so will her sense of
nationalism. In the interim Japanese nationalism grows
slowly while the domestic agenda is clouded by factional
politics and international issues which impact on the
Japanese only slightly. There is little else happening which
threatens to subvert the natural maturation of Japanese
nationalism in its current direction except U. S. pressures
on Japan to rearm and take a greater role in regional
security. This pressure could conceivably alienate the
Japanese in terms of being an insult to what the Japanese
may feel is a level of respect due to them because of their
relative importance in the world but which they do not feel
they are getting from the United States. At the same time it
provides a reason to rearm which is far from U. S. interests.-
The U. S. is thus presented with a dilemma. The
environment presents growing nationalism and economic power
in Japan as well as a growing threat in the region. On one
hand, we see the growing power of the Soviet Union and
increasing number of "holes in the dyke" which require armed
"fingers" to plug. Japan is seemingly enjoying a "free
ride" on defense while U. S. resources continue to be
stretched thinner and thinner. On the other hand, Japan has
proposed a policy which provides for little acceptance of
military responsibility but which is in concert with the
ideals of U. S. interests.
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If the U. S. presses Japan to take a greater role in her
own defense, we ask her to subordinate her stated goals and
security ideals to our conception of the threat. We -are, in
effect, stating that we either have no faith in Japanese
methods or we are too chauvinistic to allow any other ally
to chart the course to achieve our mutual goals.
Conversely, if we accept the Japanese policy position that
Comprehensive Security is a starting point, we show the
Japanese- -with the world watching- -that the U.S. has enough
confidence in our allies to give them an equal stake in
policy planning. This does little to offset the growing
defense shortfall but the potential benefits in producing a
much stronger alliance far outweigh the drawbacks.
As Japanese nationalism and pride increases, . we will
have strengthened our bond with Japan and not given them a
reason to find fault with our relationship. Comprehensive
Security should be viewed in positive terms as a step in the
right direction and not as an obstacle to be overcome in
achieving U. S. goals. It is an excellent opportunity for
the U. S. to tell the Japanese what they "need" to hear and
demonstrate that the U. S. is big enough to let all our
friends have a stake in the decisionmaking process of peace
and not just in the consequences of a unilateral U. S.
decision. Where the Japanese are concerned, this show of
good faith is especially important.
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Now let us examine the possible economic consequences of
a competing Japanese arms industry, one which would have a
major impact on the world's economic status quo.
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V. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF COMPETITIVE JAPANESE DEFENSE
INDUSTRIES
Since the end of the second World War, Japan has enjoyed
phenomenal economic growth under the protection of the
United States. The policy of the Supreme Commander Allied
Powers (SCAP), 88 which evolved quickly from a desire for
retribution, was to get Japan back on her economic feet and
return the country to the international community as a
functioning and productive member. Article IX of the 1947
MacArthur Constitution89 forbade the Japanese from
rebuilding their armed forces. Japan was left free of the
responsibility for her own defense- -indeed, was stripped of
the authority to exercise military force- -and tasked only
with her national recovery. Thus did Japan rise from a
nation decimated by a costly war to become third in the
world in economic power less than twenty years later. 90
88 General MacArthur 's title during the occupation.
89 The full text is available from a variety of sources;
I have used Arthur E. Tiedemann, Modern Japan . (New York: D.
Van Nostrand Company, 1962), p. 159.
90 Frederica M. Bunge, ed. , Japan A Country Study . 4th
edition, (Washington, D. C. : U.S. Government Printing Office,
1983), p. 143. Although statistics are not available at
this writing, Japan may be second in the world- -having
surpassed the Soviet Union in the early 80' s. See "40 Years
After War, Prosperous Japan Shies Away From World Role,"
Christian Science Monitor . 14 August 1985, p. 1.
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This amazing economic comeback has sparked a feeling in
the United States that Japan has enjoyed a "free ride" for
too long. 91 These people feel the time has come for Japan to
contribute more to her own defense. This has been
exacerbated by U. S. industry lobbying for import
restrictions and tariffs on Japanese goods which compete in
the United States against domestic production and by
Congress, seeking to alleviate a growing trade deficit with
Japan. But what if Japan decided to increase her defense
spending? 92
In theory, if the Japanese were to shoulder a greater
share of the defense burden for itself and/or the region,
this would cause a restructuring of the system for
allocating resources among her industries. By committing
more resources to defense industries, those industries which
compete with U.S. domestic industry would receive less,
produce less, and be less of a threat to U.S. domestic
industry. Other areas of the economy, such as the balance of
payments and currency exchange rates, might be affected as
well. In this chapter the prospect of significant Japanese
91 See, for example, Takubo Tadae, "Perception Gap
Between Tokyo and Washington," Asia Pacific Community
(Summer 1982) 14-15.
92 The first assumption here is actually that "increased
defense spending" and "military power" are synonymous. For
a nation as efficient as Japan, a true decision to buildup
would validate this assumption.
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rearmament will be analyzed for its potential impact on the
economies of both the United States and Japan. This
exercise is done only to dramatize a potential and not to
indicate Japanese leanings toward a decision in either
direction. This is a glimpse of another reason as to why we
should not rush the Japanese into an arms buildup. In this
hypothetical situation, many political realities will be
ignored to focus on the economic potential of Japan to
produce arms.
To do this requires that numerous assumptions be made;
for simplicity, however, only the most relevant are
mentioned. The first is that Japan has made the political
decision, for whatever reason, 93 to increase defense
spending to a level commensurate with other major powers in
the West. 94 This is not an unconscionable assumption. U.S.
pressures on Japan for increased defense spending have
increased noticeably since the mid 1970' s. In 1983 Prime
Minister Nakasone confirmed that Japan will perform
patrolling and security of the sea lanes 1000 miles from
93U. S. pressures on Japan to rearm appear to be the most
likely reason but this should not be limit of possible
reasons. Rising nationalism may lead the Japanese to such a
course on their own accord.
94 Three percent is a reasonable figure. The 1980 defense
spendings of the major NATO countries, as a percentage of
GNP, vary between 3.3% and 5.6%. Lee D. Olvey, James R.
Golden, and Robert C. Kelly, The Economics of National
Security . (Wayne, N. J. : Avery Publishing Group, Inc., 1984)
p. 315.
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Japanese coasts. 95 This in itself will require increased
spending on the Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF) and the
Air SDF (ASDF) for equipment, training, and logistical
support.
A second assumption is that Japan has opted to produce
her own arms rather than purchase them from an outside
source. This is a fairly safe assumption 96 since the
physical apparatus is already in place as well as the
decision being an economically sound one. As an
industrialized nation, it will require little effort to
convert certain industries to defense; Mitsubishi, as an
example, already produces limited arms. An increase in plant
production and expansion would be relatively easy. 97
Finally, because the point of this chapter is to
emphasize the economic possibilities and not to debate
political considerations (which are numerous and significant
95 Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko actually agreed to this in
1981 but quibbling on his part, resulting from pressure in
Japan, cast a shadow on his pledge. See Edward A. Olsen,
U. S. -Japan Strategic Reciprocity . (Stanford, CA: Hoover




96Although there are other ways of expending this money,
such as foreign military aid and grants, the focus in this
chapter is on the production aspects of military weapons.
The assumption is meant to specifically exclude the option
of purchasing arms from third party nations.
97
"Rearming Japan," Business Week . 14 March 1983, p.
107.
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in their own right), no other political problems 98 will be
considered. This has an impact in two. spheres, foreign and
domestic politics. Domestically, the key issue is the
sincerity of the Japanese to remain an unarmed,
unaggressive, and militarily introverted nation. This may or
may not prove true in circumstances where Japan finds it
desirable to change this policy. Olsen has indicated that
Japan could be moved from this position toward a "more
responsible position" fairly easily if the United States
would "twist a few arms". He has caveated this, however, by
emphasizing the point that Japan tends to offer arms for
twisting when political expediency dictates. Despite this,
he does feel that their nuclear allergy is sincere" and is
not proposing a policy of "Japan bashing".
The political impact of this decision on the other
regional nations will be intentionally overlooked in favor
of emphasizing the economic potential of a new Japan with a
"Including domestic Japanese distaste for such action,
the uneasiness of Pacific Asian nations at such a move
(witness the textbook controversy of the early 1980' s) and
possible Soviet pressures on Japan to prevent such an
action. There are numerous facets to this topic and this
list is far from complete.
"From private conversations with Dr. Olsen on 7
December 1984. Concerning the nuclear allergy, I received a
significantly different view during a private conversation
on 11 April 1985 from Dr. Ronald A. Morse of the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars. Dr. Morse
indicated that he would not be surprised if the Japanese
were armed with nuclear weapons within the decade.
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new world role. All trade relations will be assumed to
remain intact. Again, this would seem a reasonable
assumption; statements made by Suharto, Marcos (before his
exile), and other regional leaders concerning Japanese sea
lane patrols indicate that no political or economic
sanctions will be imposed upon Japan for this 100 as long as
Japan operates under the watchful eye of the United States.
Then, too, as time continues to pass and heal wounds, this
becomes more realistic.
A. A COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE IN DEFENSE?
With an additional US $21-$55 billion dollars to spend
on defense, 101 Japan now has decisions to make concerning
how it will be spent. Although there are several areas
which could be looked at- -manpower acquisitions, training,
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) purchases, etc. --of immediate
interest, from a comparative advantage point of view, is
arms production versus arms purchases. This scenario assumed
the Japanese would produce their own arms. Is this in the
10
"Claude A. Buss, ed. , National Security Interests in
the Pacific Basin . Hoover Institution. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1985, pp. 102-103. Subsequent
references to this work will be cited as Buss, Pacific
Basin .
101 Based on a GNP of US $1,046 trillion. United States
Department of State, "Background Notes Japan", (Washington,
D. C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1983), p. 1. One
percent equals US $10.46 billion; an increase of 2% to a
total of 3% equals an increase of 2 x 10. 46 equals 20. 92
billion.
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U. S. interest? Several factors go into answering this
question, but comparative advantage will be the basis for
analysis here.
Japanese heavy industry is fully capable of producing
arms and has been doing so since 1953 when Japanese industry
began to produce and maintain equipment for U. S. forces in
Asia. The Japanese now produce their own tanks, destroyers,
helicopters, and transport planes. 102 The raw materials
necessary for such production already flow into Japan and
for Japan to divert larger quantities from one area to
defense would make little difference to the exporting nation
from whom Japan buys them. The difference is in the
distribution of the finished product and the revenues
generated.
As a given, Japan must create a surplus and export it to
survive. 103 Because the arms in this scenario are now
consumed by the Japanese, the revenues for having converted
raw materials into manufactures cease to flow into Japan.
With these decreased revenues, Japan will have less money to
102Bunge, p. 370.
103 Some say import to survive— the point is that Japan
must generate revenues by turning raw materials into
manufactures and selling them. It ' s a chicken-or-the-egg
proposition.
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purchase the raw materials to create the arms and the circle
becomes ever tighter until the entire Japanese economy is
choked.
The solution is that Japan must export a portion of
these weapons to keep revenues up. This is quite feasible if
Japan enjoys a comparative advantage in arms production. It
is not so lucrative if they do not. Fortunately for Japan,
they have an edge.
Japan is a world leader in high technology products,
particularly electronics. Such capability could lead Japan
to become a strong exporter of electronic weapons. 104 The
market for high technology arms from the United States alone
totaled over two billion dollars worldwide in 1983. 105
Japan, with their high technology arms, could very easily
become an exporter of arms in competition with the United
States. This would be in character with previous behavior
as an economic competitor, although out of character as a
postwar political move. Again, for the sake of emphasis, I
reiterate that political considerations are not the focus
here and thus will not be dealt with.
104
"Rearming Japan," p. 107.
1
° Comptroller, DSAA, "Foreign Military Sales, Foreign
Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as
of September 30, 1983", (Washington, D. C. : Gov't Printing
Office, 1983) p. 37. This was only the licensed commercial
exports from the United States; total FMS was nearly $11
billion. Subsequent references will be cited as 'FMS book'.
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Linder's 106 theory— that a nation imports items, then
begins domestic production, finally becoming a net
exporter- -has a nearly textbook example in the Japanese
model with textiles and aluminum. 1 ° 7 Although Linder was
speaking of luxury items, the principle still holds for this
application. This has some relevance here as Japan could
easily follow the same pattern in the arms market. One
difference might be in the early importation of arms, but
Japan buys arms now from the United States and this serves
to fit the theory.
Whether Japan would eventually compete in this market
with the United States is a political issue; whether they
possess the economic capacity to do so, and in the process
alter the political situation, is obviously a reality.
Japan has the capability to provide a product which
satisfies a great demand and has few competitors. There may
or may not be a comparative advantage in arms production
over the United States, but there would certainly be one
over a large portion of the third world, from whom Japan
buys her raw materials.




B. IMPACT ON THE JAPANESE ECONOMY
The raw resources needed by Japan come from a variety of
nations. Japan's greatest need is oil to supply the energy
required for manufacturing output. 108 Japan's primary source
of oil is the OPEC; oil also accounts for the largest of the
Japanese trade deficits totalling nearly $31 billion in
1981.109 gy trading weapons with the OPEC countries, Japan
could make significant strides toward reducing this trade
deficit. Although U. S. commercial arms exports to the
Middle East totaled only $315 million in 1983, total FMS
sales to the region were over $6.1 billion. 110
This is significant because it is a reasonable
assumption that Japan would follow a defense buildup and
arms exportation program with a similar program having all
the aspects of the U. S. Foreign Military Sales programs.
108 Oil will be used as a sample commodity because it's
important and because I want to avoid needless repetition of
all the imports of Japan. The major import groups are food
(about 30% of total intake; 50% of caloric intake is
imported) and raw materials (nearly all). Bunge, p. 199.
1 ° 9Albert Bressand, The State of the World Economy .
(Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co, 1982) p. 316.
110 FMS book, pp. 11, 37. N. B. These are approximations;
the source combines the Near East and South Asia while I
refer to OPEC. The non-Middle East nations which are not
included are thus made up for by non-OPEC nations of South
Asia and the Middle East.
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The addition of yet another aspect, Foreign Military
Construction Sales could whittle away even more of the trade
deficit with OPEC countries.
In consonance with the theory stated in the
introduction, this new emphasis on arms exports will have
forced a reallocation of the resources being imported. Many
of the resources used in arms are used in non-military
hardware such as cars. A reduction in the sales revenues
from cars in foreign markets will have to be compensated for
in arms sales to the point where it is not only more
profitable to sell arms than to sell cars, but the profit is
large enough to justify restructuring a portion of the
industrial base to an arms industry.
As the new industry causes an increase in Japanese
demand for resources critical to arms production, the price
for these resources will be driven up on the world market.
Simultaneously, the demand for yen should increase to pay
for these arms. In the long run, the net result for the
Japanese will most likely be a zero change in real
purchasing power since they will be buying more expensive
resources but with a better exchange rate for their yen.
Mentioned earlier were the notions of increased manpower
acquisitions, training, and patrolling exercises as possible
sources of expenditures. These items would certainly have a
more far-reaching impact on the Japanese economy. Anyone who
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has ever lived in the vicinity of a U. S. military base will
immediately grasp the implications for the economy of areas
where these bases are either built or enlarged.
There will be a shift in the job market as civilian
employees are required in large numbers to support bases.
The addition of large numbers of military personnel to an
area increases the flow of money in the local area. Base
construction will increase demand for building materials and
civilians to perform the labor. Training land requirements
could radically change the nature of agricultural and dairy
industry, although this is unlikely due to realistic
domestic political considerations. Finally, increased
military activity such as sea lane patrols or troop
deployments will boost fuel oil consumption and force
allocation strategy changes to insure adequate reserves
remain available for military use. These are only a few of
the most obvious impacts of increased military spending on
local areas.
C. IMPACT ON UNITED STATES
For the United States this is a case for the proverbial
"good news and bad news". The good news is that U. S.
military forces, already spread thin around the world, would
then have a reduced burden in the Pacific. This would free
U.S. forces for assignment in other, more critical, areas of
the world. Having had to reallocate some resources into the
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defense sector, Japanese industries would then be producing
fewer cars and exports United States would decrease allowing
•U. S. car manufacturers to produce with less competition.
This means a decrease in trade deficit with Japan. The sales
of some of our weapons technology, previously unusable to
the Japanese, might even give us a trade surplus.
Another aspect that is a plus for the Japanese may also
be a plus for the United States. This is the stronger yen.
With a stronger yen, the United States may find a softening
of the Japanese market as U. S. products become more within
the means of the Japanese. 111 However, this can be both a
curse and a boon- -a stronger yen will necessarily mean a
weaker dollar in comparison. The really bad news, however,
is that the United States will have a new trade competitor
in a whole new ballgame--arms sales.
U. S. arms are highly valued around the world for their
quality and state of the art technology. Generally, the arms
business has only a few real competitors on the
technological level with the United States as we do not sell
our latest technology. The entry into the field by the
Japanese could change the profile of high technology arms
llx The events of early 1986 have shown this to be true.
The drop in the Yen from about Y250 = $1 to Y165 = $1 during
early 1986 has made US products more available to the
Japanese although the reverse has hurt their economy,
pricing many of their products too high in foreign markets
to be competitive.
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and make exported versions of U. S. equipment substandard on
the world market. This would reduce our arms sales and
possibly cause critical defense industries to close down or
cut back production, cooling our defense base. A "warm"
defense base is desirable so that defense production can be
resumed quickly and efficiently, should the need arise.
This is not the only fear shared by American businessmen.
Equally as disconcerting as arms competition is the fear
that U. S. defense technology may find its way back to the
United States in the form of non-military applications. 112
U.S. businessmen fear that U.S. military technology, sent to
Japan for defense application, will be converted into other
commercial applications, such as satellites and commercial
aircraft. These items might then be sold in the United
States in direct competition with U. S. goods. Still other
problems may include pressure from EEC nations, Great
Britain and France in particular, who are major arms
exporters and who will also feel the pinch of Japanese
competition. These pressures could introduce new trade
problems in the Atlantic trade, possibly even totally
offseting the gains made from the Japanese.
112
"The Dangers of Sharing American Technology,
Business Week . 14 March 1983, p. 109.
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D. THE RIGHT DECISION?
United States policymakers have, for the last several
years, been pressing the Japanese for increased defense
spending. Japan has come into its own economically and it
is only right that having "taken" for so many years and
reaped the considerable benefits, Japan should start
"giving" a little. This chapter began with the assumption
that Japan has, indeed, begun to "give" a little. Now the
question is whether U. S. policymakers made the right
decision in pressing Japan for this change. There are both
pluses and minuses to be considered here.
Since, in this hypothetical, the political decision has
been made to produce arms in quantity, it is highly likely
that Japan would enter the into the arms export business if
more self reliance in this field were to be decided upon. It
is equally likely that Japan would quickly gain a
comparative advantage in the arms industry. High technology
and efficient manufacturing would make Japan a formidable
competitor. While Japan's shift in resources to arms
industries may relieve import competition in the U. S.
domestic automobile and steel industries, we risk
challenging our arms industry. Eventual compromise of high
technology may even occur if the Japanese sell high
technology arms to nations which, under U.S. regulations,
were not previously allowed to have them.
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Further, dual-use technology research and development
efforts in Japan, available to us since only 1983, may dry
up as this technology is recognized by the Japanese as a
highly marketable commodity. The United States is still the
leader in military applications of high technology, but the
Japanese are not far behind. If we lose a source of high
technology as valuable as this one, 113 our own defense may
suffer- -if not in any tangible way, then by the need to
reallocate some of our own defense resources into research
and development to make up for that which we previously
obtained from Japan.
The ire of EEC nations, notably France and the United
Kingdom, who depend on their arms exports as a substantive
portion of their economies, may be vented on us in the form
of detrimental trade policies. While this is beyond the
scope of this paper, the impact on all aspects of the world
economy are relevant and would have to be considered by a
U. S. policymaker. It is in this light that the impact of a
strengthening yen must be considered. The impact of a
stronger yen will not be felt only by the United States; all
the world's currencies will be affected. 114
1 l 3As an example, our stealth technology is based in
part on Japanese high technology sales to us. See Jon
Woronoff, "Measuring Japanese Military Threat," The Oriental
Economist . February 1984, p. 23.
114 Again, this is readily visible in mid-1986.
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On the positive side, our trade deficit with Japan will,
in all likelihood, decrease rapidly as fewer imports enter
the country. This shrinking foreign supply will further
reduce the imbalance and return a competitive edge to U. S.
firms. As Japan purchases arms initially to make up for
immediate shortfalls, our arms industries will profit and it
is even conceivable that a short term trade surplus would be
run during the period that their industries gear up into
full production.
The final positive element is that U. S. military
presence in the region may be decreased to permit increased
force levels in more troubled regions of the world without
the added expense of training and equipping more soldiers.
Our defense expenditures will not have to be increased to
meet the increased threat globally. We need only
"redistribute" our military resources. From a purely
economic standpoint, it appears that the Japanese would
benefit greatly from a decision to increase defense spending
to comparable NATO levels. The short term costs will
quickly be made up for by long term gains in an industry
which has few competitors on par with Japan.
Having initially ignored political issues in order to
"cry wolf" with this argument, it is only fair in conclusion
to caveat the argument again by reiterating my purpose- -this
hypothesis was presented for evaluation to point out a
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potential which Japan has and which will change slowly even
as political variables change quickly in comparison.
U. S. policymakers must weigh a number of elements as
they decide on how much to pressure the Japanese into
increasing their defense spending. A significant element is
the long term effects of a Japanese arms competitor versus
the possibly transient benefits of reduced U. S. strength
requirements, and their associated costs, in the Pacific
Basin.
It is not so clear whether the U. S. would gain from such
a Japanese move. While U. S. defense requirements lessen
initially to our benefit, we may damage U. S. -Japanese ties
by forcing a move which has not been wholly supported by the
Japanese. Further, this argument focused intentionally on
the economic aspects of a competing arms industry and not on
manpower. If the nation's policy were to change course,
nine trillion yen 115 will buy a lot more than arms. It buys
prestige and prestige attracts men. Suddenly, a proud
Japanese army, full of samurai spirit, is present in Japan.
Will that Japan be our friend and ally or an angry nation
too long bullied by the U. S? At some future point when
Japan decides to become a military power, the U.S. must be
able to look forward to enjoying these benefits secure in
115 Based on $1 = Y170; $55 billion dollars (6% GNP, see
footnote 101) = Y9. 3 trillion yen.
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the knowledge that Japan is rearming in accordance with a
decision arrived at by a process of mutual consent and
desire. At this point, the U.S. will have achieved the
strategic integration required and have retained the respect
of an ally who feels they have an equal say in our mutual
destiny as well as an equal stake.
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VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U. S. -JAPAN RELATIONSHIP
As the two superpowers compete for power around the
world, the relative strength of each at any given spot rises
and falls. The danger of war is increased as the
superpowers attempt to compensate for a perceived drop in
power. Attempts, particularly by the Soviet Union, to alter
the balance of power in the region increase tensions in the
region, magnify the sensitivity of the precarious balance
and promote instability. In the early 1980' s the Soviet
Union greatly increased its presence in the Pacific region.
Combined with a diminishing U.S. presence during the 1970 's
and the abandonment of Vietnam, U. S. credibility has wavered
in the eyes of our regional allies and other nations. This
has added to uncertainty of U. S. ties and allowed the
Soviets to step up their program of revolution, promote
instability, and dramatically increase their regional
stature- -the best example being Vietnam.
The United States cannot risk continued setbacks in the
credibility of our defense effort in Asia or elsewhere. The
evolving economic structure of the world and the increasing
interdependence of all nations make the threat to any nation
a threat to all; if any nation's economy is disrupted, the
potential repercussions throughout the world are magnified
89
as the disrupted trade of that one nation disrupts the
exports of three other nations. In effect, a snowball can
result. Because of the serious consequences of economic
disruption, we must be even more careful in our handling of
perceived threats to the region. As mentioned, Japanese
defense policy is one area where strengthening in opposition
to our common threat has not been commensurate with U. S.
hopes. It is to this we now turn.
A. JAPANESE DEFENSE POLICY AND THE UNITED STATES
Japanese defense policy has its roots deeply entrenched
in the feelings which ensued after the loss of the Pacific
War. The Japanese people felt betrayed by the militarists
who had led them to such utter defeat. Article IX of the
constitution was a reaction against Japanese militarism and
was the beginning of a long period of pacifism and
anti-military sentiment within the general public. While
these sentiments have lasted into the 1980' s, the actual
policy was short-lived.
With the outbreak of the Korean War, U.S. use of bases
in Japan to stage from and run the logistical operations
essential to the war effort drastically modified the
immediate post-war policy. U. S. forces were aided by former
members of the Imperial Navy in conducting mine clearing
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operations in the waters surrounding Korea. 116 With the
formation of the National Safety Agency in the early 1950 '
s
and its subsequent renaming of the 100,000 man force as the
Japan Defense Agency in 1954, the ice was broken as far as
maintaining a military force.
Since then, Japanese defense efforts have increased
despite public sentiment and constitutional prohibition.
Interpretations of the constitution have provided the leeway
for Japanese officials to increase the defense budget to its
current level of nearly US $11 billion, ranking seventh in
the world. 117 The significant role of public opinion in
Japan is not unnoticed, however. In the last decade the
notion of a 1% cap on defense spending has been widely
supported by the general public 118 and has served to keep
Japanese expenditures in defense below the level which the
1 x
6
Morinaga Kazuhiko, "Japan-U. S. Perception Gap on
Defense," Asia Pacific Community 20 (Spring 1983): 13.
1
x
7Richard L. Sneider, U. S. -Japanese Security Relations .
(New York: Columbia University, 1982), p. 69. The Japanese
themselves claim to be 8th in the world. See Japan, Defense
Agency, Defense Bulletin : Summary of ' Defense of Japan
1983'
. (Tokyo, 1983), p. 39. The 1984 Defense of Japan , p.




USIA Report R-13-84, p. 7 indicated a mixed view on
exceeding the 1% level. USIA statistics, however, show a
wide majority (greater than 45% in most cases) of the
opinion that the 1% ceiling should be held or reduced. See
p. 32.
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U. S. feels is adequate to defend Japan and contribute to the
regional defense.
There are two major problems with the current Japanese
policy. First, Japan has determined that a mobilization base
must be maintained. 119 Given the high cost associated with a
low output, the defense industry operates with a built-in
disadvantage. If Japan were to increase spending on
equipment, the increased quantity would not only bolster
Japanese equipment levels, but reduce the per-item costs of
this military hardware. This impacts primarily on the
Japanese.
The second problem is that the Japanese have assumed a
best case scenario for their defense planning. 120 This
policy has had as its basis the assumptions that the U. S.
military commitment to the region and to Japan was total and
that the peace of the region would continue. The relative
calm of Northeast Asia has been shaken by several events,
however. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the
Soviet force buildup in the "Northern Territories", the
deployment of both SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers to
within striking range of Japan, and the almost daily
overflights by Soviet reconnaissance planes have all served
to wear thin the Japanese security blanket and counter the
119 Sneider, p. 75.
120 Sneider, p. 100.
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cycle of public opinion that has, for so long, been the
excuse and reason used by the Japanese government to stall
U. S. efforts to have Japan increase her defense
expenditures.
Japanese leaders are now realizing, along with the
general public, that U.S. resources are not infinite; Soviet
expansion in all areas of the world is forcing the United
States to react over the span of the entire globe and that
Japan, important as it is, still is only one area of many.
This realization is being made manifest in a number of ways
but especially noteworthy is the election- -and
reelection- -of Prime Minister Nakasone. Granted that he has
not made the sweeping changes to the Japanese defense budget
that were expected in 1983, he has, nevertheless, been the
instigator of many other nuances and subtle changes. 121 It
is with Nakasone that the present U. S. administration has
based its hopes of reshaping Japanese defense policy.
121 I refer to his visits to the Yasukuni shrine as Prime
Minister, his alleged association with Mishima, his
right-of-center stance, and other "statements". See, among
other sources, New York Times, "August in Tokyo Evokes
Echoes of Militarist Past," 16 August 1984, p. A. 2, Henry
Stokes Scott, "Mishima, a Movie and Nakasone," Japan
Quarterly 31 (Jan-Mar 1984): 49. Further, while he has been
unable to cause sweeping reforms in Japanese defense
policies, his ideas and attitudes have impacted on Japanese
thought accelerating this type of thinking. Olsen suggests
that this may be his greatest contribution in his discussion
of Nakasone 's impact on Japanese thought in Reciprocity . See
pp. 36, 49-51, and 80-81.
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The highly publicized "Ron-Yasu" relationship, which
seemed so promising at the outset of the Nakasone
premiership, has yet to produce the results so ardently
desired by the United States government. Admittedly,
economic concessions have been made- -voluntary quotas on
cars, increases in citrus imports- -these are steps in the
right direction, but tiny steps. The tougher rhetoric on
trade present in the U. S. press during the early part of
1985, may have helped produce the more fruitful results in
the yen-dollar ratio seen in late '85 and early 1986.
The Japanese are fully cognizant of the economic
implications for both countries. While they may generally
recognize "what's good for the U.S. is good for Japan", they
also know that "what's bad for Japan ain't necessarily bad
for the U. S. " It is this latter contention which is causing
the hesitancy; slowing down the Japanese economy, as a shift
to defense production is bound to do in the short run, will
hurt Japan while it helps the United States. Additionally,
Japan's policy of Comprehensive Security reflects a national
mood as well as a national goal. Shifting to defense
production would be inconsistent with this policy and I am
not saying that such a change is imminent. The potential to
do so, however, makes it all the more important that the
U. S. nurture Japanese friendship and thus insure any future
nationalistic movements do not find a scapegoat in the
United States.
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B. THE CONTINUING DILEMMA
Soviet power in the Pacific Ocean is increasing while
their concurrently increasing actions throughout the world
are steadily diluting U. S. force levels as we attempt to
respond. Despite this obvious challenge, the Japanese, a
major supporter of U.S. principles if not an outright ally,
continue to cling to their own interpretations of the Soviet
threat.
The Japanese are not unaware of this threat; indeed,
specific actions perpetrated against the Japanese have
increased their awareness of the danger of Soviet power.
Despite this, the Japanese remain hesitant to increase their
own military power for self-defense. The sentiment in Japan
remains strongly anti-military as a result of the loss of
World War II under the militarists, but more so, because of
the economics of the current situation.
Japan, having developed into one of the economic
superpowers of the world, recognizes the importance of her
economy to an interdependent world. Conservative LDP members
appear to be counting on, among other reasons, the world in
general and the Soviets in particular to recognize the
importance of Japan's economy to the well-being of the world
and the potential damage to the economies of all nations if
Japan were attacked. It is from this position that many
Japanese espouse neutrality and tend to insist on their own
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independence vis-a-vis the U. S.
,
particularly when we refer
to Japan as an ally or when we discuss increased defense
spending for our mutual protection.
Japan is also hesitant to shift into arms production for
fear of the stigma which would certainly attach itself to
all her exports. The potential damage to her economy which
might be caused if she were once again viewed as a "merchant
of death" greatly sensitizes the Japanese leadership to this
issue. Japan has worked very hard since World War II to
paint herself in a new light and does not want to jeopardize
her economic well-being by having to deal with her neighbors
and more distant trading partners in any form associated
with her militarist past. Hence, strident U.S. pressure for
an increased security posture is snubbed in Japan and feared
in other Pacific Basis nations as a revival of the Greater
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere; Japan fears the militaristic
overtones and the reaction of this by other nations with
whom she must do business to survive. The other nations fear
that a strong Japan, whose military and defense expenditures
already far exceed their own, might once again lead to a
Japanese dominated region.
Prime Minister Nakasone's position throughout his
political career has been hawkish and his selection by the
conservative LDP as party president and thus Prime Minister
was seen by the U. S. as an indicator of changing Japanese
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attitudes. His comments that Japan would become an
"unsinkable aircraft carrier" 122 against the Soviet threat
were not well received in Japan, however, and despite U. S.
hopes that he would change the direction of Japan's defense
strategy, these hopes have not, thus far, been borne out.
His rhetoric has been toned down in this regard adding
credence to the argument that he is succumbing to political
pressure from fellow party members.
Japan has taken steps to accommodate U. S. goals
concerning defense. Loose interpretations of the
constitution have allowed a defense buildup, since the end
of World War II, to rank seventh or eighth in the world
(depending upon the source). While the non-nuclear
principles may be sincerely imbedded, the fact that Japan
maintains a mobilization base, small that it may be,
indicates they are keeping their options open. This very
willingness to maintain open options, as well as a quarter
of a million men under arms, is encouraging to proponents of
any policy which seeks greater such measures.
Such is the stage upon which the United States must
formulate a policy to strengthen both our position in the
region vis-a-vis Japan and our position globally in the wake
of an increasing Soviet threat. Burden sharing has not been
122Yagisawa Mitsuo, "Maintaining Japanese Security"
Japan Quarterly 30 (Oct-Dec 1983): 357.
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accepted by the Japanese elites because the Comprehensive
Security policy of Japan is viewed by them as the equal of
most NATO contributions. 123
C. A NEW POLICY PROPOSAL
U. S. interests are both global and regional. Any
attempt to propose U. S. policy toward Japan must first
determine what U. S. -interests are vis-a-vis Japan. These
interests, both long and short term, will provide the goals
for which actions structured through policy are intended to
attain. Because our interests are not all of equal
importance, the policy must be defined in such a way as to
provide some prioritization of U. S. interests.
The primary interest of the United States is the
security of the nation. Security insures the survival of
the nation and thus allows for other, lesser, interests.
The cornerstone of all U. S. policy must be the preservation
of the nation. In this respect, trade of resources
necessary for the nation to defend itself falls into the
range of the nation's primary interest. Maintenance of
global U. S. influence insures U. S. ability to have a
123This is, of course, almost an apples and oranges
comparison since NATO contributions are purely military
while Comprehensive Security encompasses other aspects.
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powerful voice in the affairs of the world. Finally,
efforts to maintain and improve the peace by reducing or
negating the threat increases the security of all nations.
Secondary interests include maintenance of free trade
and access to markets worldwide to insure access to products
and resources which improve American standards of living and
quality of life. To maintain this quality of life, it is in
our interest to share the cost of defense among those
nations who share the benefits of a strong and stable
American presence.
I have identified growing Japanese nationalism as a
potential threat as well as boon to U. S. security and
influence in the Pacific. Additionally, Japan's industrial
potential to produce arms could reduce or eliminate U. S.
access to Japanese research and development efforts and
dual-use technology- -both are considered national security
assets- -if Japan became an arms producer in her own right.
U. S. policy toward Japan must reflect both the long and
short term goals of the United States with respect to Japan.
The analysis of this paper suggests at least two long term
goals and one short term goal which current U. S. policy
addresses unsatisfactorily and possibly dangerously.
One long term goal should be to insure that the
Japanese, in becoming a military power, do so within the
auspices of a mutually (and eventually even multilaterally
)
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agreed upon necessity. By alleviating Japanese feelings
that they are being treated as second class citizens, we
reduce the potential adverse effects of rising nationalism
combined with military capability and sense of destiny. By
adopting a policy of conciliation with regard to Japanese
views of their own destiny, the U.S. can support Japanese
efforts in providing an economically interdependent world
without providing cause for uneven military buildup.
This will not forestall the growth of nationalism,
however, not that any policy could or would want to. As
Japan achieves greater success in her global endeavors it is
inevitable that her pride will increase also; this is
already happening. This U. S. goal of tempering a Japanese
military buildup succeeds by refocusing the growth of
nationalism on the positive aspects of successful Japanese
policy rather than on the constraints and negative aspects
of a U. S. policy. Such a U. S. policy is designed to badger
the Japanese into actions inconsistent with their stated
national policy, peace through interdependence.
Achievement of the second long term goal would flow from
a U. S. policy which cautions against undue growth of a
powerful Japanese military and counters the potential
economic problems associated with an indigenous Japanese
arms industry. Forestalling this industry serves the dual
role of providing, in effect, only one customer for Japanese
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dual-use technology and military related research and
development.
Steps to secure our short term goals must be consistent
with those of our long term goals. The U. S. is deeply
concerned about a growing trade imbalance and "burden
sharing" in all its various forms has been suggested by some
as one solution. This runs counter to our long term goals,
however. A conciliatory policy recognizing Japanese efforts
in areas besides the growth of their military serves to
strengthen a U. S. position calling for alternative methods
of sharing the costs associated with defense.
One solution may be to accept Comprehensive Security at
face value. 124 This does little to redistribute the burden
of defense but is a gesture of respect toward Japan. In
time we may use the concept of Comprehensive Security to
have Japan purchase our surplus farm products for subsequent
aid distributions. This could be considered the Japanese
contribution as a major power to defense. Although it
sounds almost mercenary, this is not the same as simply
having Japan pay us for the defense provided to them. It
diminishes our aid program somewhat but accomplishes several
things: it eases the trade deficit, it reflects a U.S.
willingness to honor Japanese ideals as laid down in the
124 see Barnett, Bevond War . chapter 1 for the official
summary of Comprehensive Security.
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policy of Comprehensive Security, it becomes a matter of
record that Japan has increased her defense spending- -even
if for farm products, it prevents the buildup of the
Japanese military, and subsequently reduces the likelihood
that a Japanese arms industry will emerge.
Instituting such a policy would involve several steps.
The United States must begin by not playing up the immediate
Soviet military threat to Japan. The importance of ties
between the U. S. and Japan should be emphasized as well as
the benefits of Western prosperity to Japan. Finally, the
United States should seek to enhance our relationship by
giving a little- -let the Japanese have Comprehensive
Security and let us see if our own policies can be
structured to accommodate this.
Japan's destiny in the Pacific and the world is deeply
embedded in the national myths and concept of identity which
the Japanese have of themselves. As Japan again plays its
role as a major power, it is imperative that the United
States recognize the destiny which Japan sees for itself and
adopt a foreign policy which leads Japan away from the path
of military force to achieve her goals. We are at the
critical period now. Our present policy is pushing Japan in
the wrong direction; we do not want a rearmed Japan at the
cost of the national goodwill which has evolved over the
last forty years.
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Any U.S. policy must allow Japan's great economic power
to be channeled to augment the power of the U. S. -Japan
alliance. Japan has given the U. S. a policy alternative to
military power in Comprehensive Security. This policy may
do little to directly offset the growing cost to the United
States of defending the free world, but U. S. power is better
enhanced by the strength of Japan and our other allies who
enjoy the potential that Japan does. In the interim, our
policy in the Pacific may have to be one of status-quo ante
to counter the growing Soviet presence. Our policy toward
Japan should be one of respect for the differences between
us. We must not allow the insignificant frictions of trade
imbalance cloud the true issue of defending our mutual
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